Socio-political sentiments and socio-economic situation in Ukraine ...

SOCIO-POLITICAL MOOD AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN UKRAINE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN WAR (1941)

Igor Vetrov and Oleksandr Lysenko

Resumo

A situação sócio-política e sócio-económica nas terras ucranianas em relação à preparação e início da guerra germano-soviética foi analisada com base em fontes do ego (epistolares, diários, memórias de participantes na guerra) e documentos oficiais. Os autores encontraram diferenças no arquétipo mental, valores e simpatias políticas, práticas sociais e padrões de comportamento da população ucraniana que vive, por um lado, na URSS, por outro - na Polónia e na Roménia. As formas e consequências da "Sovietização" da Região da Ucrânia Ocidental, levada a cabo por meios brutais e visando uma reforma radical do sistema político e económico, laços sociais e modo de vida tradicional, unificação ideológica e destituição das instituições políticas e públicas, opressão das confissões religiosas e outros tipos de repressão de massas, foram estudados no artigo. Os autores traçaram a evolução da atitude da população da URSS perante a guerra e a lealdade/deslealdade para com os militares e civis do Exército Vermelho (patriotismo, derrotismo, deserção, desvio), bem como vários padrões de comportamento (conformismo/não-conformismo) e estratégias de sobrevivência em condições extremas e de guerra.

Palavras-chaves: Segunda Guerra Mundial e a Guerra Germano-Soviética; Ucrânia; mentalidade; soldados do Exército Vermelho; civis; condição moral e psicológica; estratégias de sobrevivência; lealdade política.

Abstract

The socio-political and socio-economic situation in the Ukrainian lands in connection with the preparation and beginning of the German-Soviet war has been analyzed based on ego sources (epistolary, diaries, memoirs of war participants) and official documents. The authors found differences in the mental archetype, values and political sympathies, social practices and patterns of behaviour of the Ukrainian population living, on the one hand, in the USSR, on the other - in Poland and Romania. The ways and consequences of "Sovietization" of the Western Ukrainian Region, carried out by brutal means and aimed at a radical reform of the political and economic system, social ties and traditional way of life, ideological unification and ousting of political and public institutions, oppression of religious denominations and other denominations types of mass repression have been studied in the article. The authors traced the evolution of the attitude of the population of the USSR to the war and the loyalty/disloyalty towards Red Army servicemen and civilians (patriotism, defeatism, desertion, deviation), as well as various patterns of behaviour (conformism/nonconformism) and survival strategies in extreme and war conditions.

Keywords: World War II and the German-Soviet War; Ukraine, mentality, Red Army soldiers; civilians; moral and psychological condition; survival strategies; political loyalty.

The aggression of Nazi Germany and its allies against the USSR came as a big surprise to most Ukrainians. The accents of Soviet propaganda in the period from September 1939, when the Wehrmacht and the Red Army invaded Poland, were placed in such a way as to diminish the image of Germany as a potential adversary after the branding of the fascist policy of the Third Reich. However, such a way of reluctance to irritate and provoke Berlin could not completely relieve the tension and anxious expectations in society. Disoriented by so sharp turn in the foreign policy course, citizens were lost in speculation as to what this might mean: whether it was a line of strategic cooperation with Hitler or a flexible manoeuvre aimed at postponing the great war? The militarization of the economy and mass consciousness in the USSR created the basis for the moral and psychological preparation of citizens for a possible war. The military doctrine of the Soviet leadership was based on the concept of short-lived war: in the event of an aggressor's attack, it was supposed to give him a decisive rebuff, transfer military action to enemy territory and complete the military campaign. In early June 1941, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces, A. Shcherbakov, sent a directive to the troops as follows: “The foreign policy of the Soviet Union has nothing to do with pacifism, with the desire to achieve peace, whatever it may be.… Thus Leninism teaches that the country of socialism, using the favourable international situation, must and have to take the initiative of offensive military action against the capitalist environment to expand the front of socialism. The international situation has worsened, the military danger for our country is approaching like never before. Under these conditions, Lenin's slogan "to defend one's land in another's territory" can at any time turn into practical actions"^[1].

In scientific discourse, this issue has a special place. In modern Ukrainian historiography, the sentiments of the civilian population and the military are covered through the prism of the deconstruction of the Soviet myth of the "unity of the party and the people" risen to repel the enemy and "nationwide" Soviet patriotism. Conceptual rethinking of the initial stage of the war marked the work of M. Koval. He for the first time, an attempt was made to overcome the rigid schemes of the Soviet ideological narrative, to present a version devoid of ideological layers of Ukrainian war history from the standpoint of Ukrainocentrism^[2]. V. Hrynevych presents in his publications a broad retrospective of the perception of war by representatives of various strata of Ukrainian society and Red Army soldiers, which are reflected in different patterns of behaviour.^[3] The publications of Yu. Nikolayets and Yu. Kostenko reveal the moral and psychological condition of servicemen and civilians of Ukraine at the initial stage of the war ^[4]. The political expectations of the nationally conscious part of Ukrainian society during the period 1939–1941 are characterized in the synthetic work of V. Kosyk, the appendices of which contain unique documents from the German archives^[5]. T. Snyder's fundamental work contains a broad retrospective of the attitude of the Soviet and Nazi totalitarian regimes to the population of the territories, which the scientist metaphorically called "bloody lands"^[6]. In the works of Russian historians, much attention is paid to the militarization of society, as well as its moral mobilization to fight the aggressors^[7]. General problems of political culture and relevant practices in the Soviet reality, including during the war, are considered in the works of Ukrainian and foreign political scientists, historians, sociologists^[8]. Significant achievements belong to researchers of Soviet realities at the turn of the '30s and '40s and the attitude of Soviet society to the Stalinist totalitarian regime^[9].

The presence of a rich list of literature, however, does not cover all aspects of this multidimensional topic. If the issues related to the Kremlin's ideological actions and the mood of the population and servicemen of the Soviet armed forces have been thoroughly covered, the peculiarities of the socio-economic situation of the civilian population remain insufficiently studied. The discovery of new documents constantly deepens the understanding of many aspects of the topic. A striking example is a transfer in 2010 by the Vienna Technical Museum (Austria) to the National Museum of Ukrainian History in World War II of a collection of letters seized by a Wehrmacht unit at the post office in Kamianets-Podilskyi and other Ukrainian cities in the summer of 1941. These ego-sources were elaborated and partially published in the Unread Letters of the 41st^[10].

The beginning of the Second World War directly affected only the inhabitants of those Ukrainian lands that were "reunited" with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by force of arms during 1939-1940. At this time, the so-called "Sovietization" took place here - the planting of the Soviet socio-political and socio-economic system. The radical reformatting of the way of life was initially perceived positively by many residents of Western Ukraine. But soon mass repressions, the forced imposition of "socialist" forms of management (including collective farms), oppression of the church, liquidation of all political parties and non-communist public organizations led to the spread of a negative reaction of the population to these activities. Instead, in other regions of the Ukrainian SSR, the public was concerned about bringing the USSR closer to Germany. Security forces constantly monitored and recorded public opinion. The special message of the NKVD of the USSR to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (B) of Ukraine Khrushchev dated August 27, 1941showed that some representatives of various strata of Ukrainian society approved and others sharply criticized the non-aggression treaty with Germany. "The treaty is a victory for Hitler, who secured his eastern borders to invade England and France and then deal with us,"said Rudensky, technical director of the Art publishing house. The lawyer of the Kyiv Bar Association said: "We bowed in front of Hitler, we bowed because although our army is strong, we do not have a rear. In the event of war, the rear will be against Soviet authority". But the worker of the plant № 215 F. Plotnytsky (Kyiv) sharply assessed the situation: "Hitler is not stupid, he pities his people. He sees that he has a crisis in raw materials, so he decided for the benefit of his people to temporarily change the policy towards the Soviet government. And we will tear away from our people and give them to the Germans if only they would not touch us. Our people are accustomed to pulling the strings, they will starve to death, but they will be afraid to say and demand because they are intimidated by arrests and deportations"^[11].

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership made considerable efforts to homogenize the western Ukrainian region. Introducing the collective farm system, the new government confiscated not only the property of large landowners but also the "kulaks" - peasants who owned more than 3.5 hectares of land. Brutally breaking the traditions of private property and individual management, the Bolshevik regime turned the local society against itself. Wealthy landlords resisted collectivization, but the authorities resorted to "eliminating the kulaks as a class" by deporting this "harmful" stratum. Collective farm slavery, combined with an extremely burdensome tax policy, doomed farmers to poverty. Protests took all possible forms: from passive to active and even extreme. A poor man Cheremykh hanged in the village Kotsyubyntsi (Ternopil Region). He complained in a death note that after his land was taken away, he had nothing to live on. In another village, Vasylkivtsi, a peasant who was forced to sign an application to join a collective farm cut his abdomen with a scythe by himself^[12]. Local armed groups of Ukrainian nationalists, supported by a large part of the local population, carried out terrorist acts against government officials and activists who assisted in the Kremlin's policy in the region. In March 1941 in the Goshiv village (Stanislav region) a village council deputy was shot dead through a window. In April in the Strugantchy village similarly was shot the accountant of the local collective farm^[13].

The "cleansing" of Western Ukraine covered all segments of society: the intelligentsia, the clergy, workers, peasants, public and political figures. Between 1939 and 1941, 10.5 thousand Ukrainians, 2.5 thousand Jews, and 16.5 thousand Poles were arrested in Western Ukraine^[14]. In addition, four waves of deportations took place at this time. Polish researcher Andrzej Szczesniak points out that during the first stage of deportations 220 thousand people were deported, the second - 320 thousand, the third - 220 thousand^[15​]. According to Ukrainian historians (V. Hrynevych, T. Vronska, Y. Shapoval and others), in general, all types of repression affected almost 1.2 million people (about 10% of the region's population). All this together, instead of mass loyalty, created for the Soviet government the image of an inhumane totalitarian dictatorship and, with the beginning of German aggression, largely determined the behaviour of the people and their attitude to the Bolshevik regime and the German occupation.

Before the threat of war, Stalin resorted to mass deportations of citizens of certain nationalities, fearing that they might become the "fifth column" of the enemy in the Soviet rear. N. Nymark noted in this regard that "the deportation and persecution of national groups were not dictated by the real threat of war and enemy penetration, but mainly by Stalin's generalized xenophobia and his pathological fear of losing power due to subversive activities of either the Fourth International or hostile statesmen"^[16]. During the pre-war operations of the NKVD against various national groups (Germans of the Volga region, Poles, Koreans, Iranians and others), 350 thousand people were arrested, of whom 247 thousand were executed.^[17] With the outbreak of World War II, the flywheel of ethnic deportations gained new momentum. According to the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 26, 1941, 84.6 thousand ethnic Germans were forcibly deported from the territory of Ukraine to the eastern regions of the USSR^[18].

Ordinary people perceived the beginning of the war as a personal tragedy. "Anyone who has not experienced this," Valentyna Verbytska recalled, "will never understand what a person feels when he hears such news. Confusion, helplessness, fear. But life is life. You need to find your place in it, although there are circumstances when you have no choice.^[19]

Some part of the population of Ukraine, in particular the older generations, who remembered the times of the German-Austrian occupation of Ukraine in 1918, hoped that the German presence would ensure liberation from Stalinist tyranny, the order in the economy, return private property and civil rights, destroy the hated collective farm system. In November, special bodies recorded the statement of the head of the technical inspection of the construction department № 211 GULAG NKVD of the USSR Starostin (his brother was shot for counter-revolutionary activities): "Ukraine saw the greatest order at the time of its occupation by the Germans. When the Germans came to Ukraine, they immediately restored order, were extremely polite and humane, and we breathed a sigh of relief for them"^[20].

The leaders of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists developed their strategy in connection with the preparation of the Third Reich for the war against the USSR. Significantly exaggerating the interest of the ruling Nazi elite in supporting Ukrainian emigrants' march to the East, the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, relying on the support of some members of the German military establishment, hoped to support the idea of reviving the Ukrainian state (at least under German). However, these illusions were not shared by all political forces of the national-state spectrum. As early as October 29, 1939, the Ukrainian nationalist newspaper Ukrainske Slovo, published in Paris, represented the following article: "The Germans occupied important Ukrainian lands before giving them to the Soviet Union as compensation for aiding the partition of Poland." The operation that took place after the transfer of Carpathian Ukraine to the Hungarians clearly shows what can be expected from the Germans… For them, the Ukrainian population is slaves who can be exchanged for oil or coal, and the Ukrainian question is just dynamite that can be used to destroy enemy states. Based on these facts and the pact with the Soviet Union, Germany now poses a very great danger to the Ukrainian question. Strangely, the great states do not realize this, but, on the contrary, fear that the Germans intend to create an independent Ukraine"^[21]. Another nationalist newspaper, the Tryzub (Paris, December 10, 1939), stated: "We must clearly understand that the victory of Hitler-Stalin is the end of all, still independent and free states, the strengthening of the shackles in which our people. On the contrary, the victory of Western democracies gives us great prospects, opens up new opportunities to achieve our independence"^[22].

The most determined part of the Ukrainian nationalist camp decided to take the opportunity and demonstrate to Berlin its readiness for state-building and responsible policy. Almost immediately after the Wehrmacht troops, the OUN members sent several "marching groups" to Ukraine, the members of which were to form local authorities and self-government bodies, the police, and take over local government. On June 31, the OUN (Bandera) promulgated the Act on the Restoration of the Ukrainian State in Lviv. Berlin's reaction was immediate: the Act was declared illegal, and OUN leaders (S. Bandera, J. Stetsko, and others) were placed under house arrest and then isolated. This was the first, but not the last blow, according to the opinion of Ukrainian state-oriented forces. Then the repression began: arrests, imprisonments and executions, which killed thousands of fighters for Ukraine's state sovereignty. In a secret document dated July 31, 1941, the OUN (B) leadership emphasized: "Our attitude to the current German attacks (the secession of Galicia, the Reich Commissariat) is completely hostile." But, given the strategic interests, the OUN leaders continued to negotiate and cooperate with German factors, considering the Stalinist USSR to be the main enemy. But soon the terror of the Nazis forced the OUN (Bandera) to move first to anti-German positions, and then to the "two-front struggle" - against the Soviet and Nazi regimes^[23].

The moral and psychological condition of the Red Army quite adequately reflected the mood in society, because millions of yesterday's peasants, workers, and employees were mobilized into the active army. The fatal miscalculations of the Soviet military-political leadership in strategic and operational planning led to panic, mass desertion and capture, and the chaotic retreat of a large part of the Red Army units. By the end of 1941, on the orders of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs L. Beria, 638,112 people suspected of desertion were detained at the front and in the rear. Of these, 555,247 were transferred to military units, 82,865 were arrested, and more than 10,000 were shot in front of the army^[24]. The operative reports of the Soviet secret services contain a lot of information that reflects the moral and psychological condition of the servicemen. For example, the Red Army soldier Buchko (mobilized in the Lviv region) expressed the following conviction: "You should not fight for Soviet authority. We will not, it did not give us anything good and we should not protect it. Collective farmers will not protect it, because they live badly on collective farms - much worse than in the former Poland." Soldiers of the Far Eastern Front, mobilised from Ukraine, reasoned among themselves: "Hitler will defeat the USSR and life will be good. There will be a one-man farm and there will be food. If we had a good life, than our soldiers would not surrender into captivity"^[25].

Overwhelmed by defeatism and unwillingness to fight for the Stalinist regime, the soldiers often shot commanders and officers in the back, who saw in them only "cannon fodder." Mykhailo Martyshko from the Pereyaslav district of Kyiv Region recalled that after the retreat, his unit was thrown into the "hot" section of the front near Romny: "We arrived there, and the German dug in, what will you do to him? There is no artillery, no tanks, only rifles and grenades." Realizing that they were thrown into "hell" for certain death, the soldiers rebelled, killed their political instructor^[26], tied his pants on a bayonet and went to surrender to the Germans^[27].

The fact that the troops received medallions on which the personal data of the Red Army millitary stuff were minted did not add optimism to the soldiers. Many superstitious soldiers did not wear or take these identifiers with them for fear that it would lead to failure or even death ("We were given medallions in case of death…", "See you, then you will know through the mail, because we were given medallions in case of death")^[28].

Nevertheless, a significant part of the Soviet troops surrounded by German tank and mechanized "wedges" did not lay down their arms and with heavy fighting and losses made their way to the location of their units. The commander of the 3rd Airborne Brigade of the 2nd Airborne Corps of the 40th Army of the South-Western Front, G. Kovalyov, who was surrounded by German near Kyiv, wrote to his wife: "Nelenka, I have not written to you for almost a month and a half. These months and a half will be remembered for a very long time. I was in the rear of the Germans. The last few days, from September 17 to 30, I broke through with a group of 15 people to my family. Went to the German rear. I had to eat nothing for 5 days, and generally ate what the rabbit would die of. But you know me, dear Nelenka. I never miss or lose heart. My whole landing brigade came out of the German rear in small groups - it was impossible in large ones. I had to go through a lot…. I once had to stand in the swamp for 36 hours almost to the waist in the water. And you know that the end of September was very cold. There were even frosts. Many could not stand it - they were sick. I was saved by my peace and health…"^[29].

For many Red Army soldiers, war quickly became a difficult but commonplace affair. The fighting situation forced them to immediately study martial arts, the science of digging, to conduct reconnaissance and protection of objects, to disguise himself, to fight a strong enemy. The letters of most Soviet soldiers show, without undue pathos, human dignity, a restrained sense of pride for their comrades who fought selflessly against the enemy, inconspicuous but true heroism, and a fatalistically calm attitude toward possible death. In mid-September 1941, covering the retreat of their units, near the village. Tarasivka (Kyiv Region) L. Zhukhovets died. The day before, feeling that he was approaching the end of his life, he addressed his family: "I am writing you a letter under a hail of shells and the whistling of bullets from fascist machine gunners. Now I am going to die, but I would like to die for a reason, at least with a little glory. The struggle is fierce. The enemy is cunning and insidious, you need to fight him with special tactics. However, I do not lose hope that sooner or later, but it will be broken"^[30].

Some tried to reassure loved ones by depicting the soldier's daily life in calm tones. "I live a military life! - Lieutenant Volodymyr Sahaidachny told his relatives. – While writing these four lines, ten planes flew back and forth, shooting, bombing. This is the tenth time today, not counting the night and what lies ahead. We got to a good place, no mosquitoes, there is a lake. I bathed three times today. Great, not counting the surprises from the air. In general, alive and well…". Mykhailo Sagaidachny, Volodymyr's father, a full cavalier of the St. George's Cross, and his brother Yuriy, who in 1943 was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for forcing the Dnieper, fought on the fronts^[31].

Many recruits, especially from rural areas, advised family members on how to run a household, care for elderly parents, and raise and educate children. "Shura," one of the soldiers instructed his wife, "manage everithing, and if you can't stand it, sell a calf or even a piglet, save yourself and our son and cow, don't run out of money, prepare fodder for the winter for cattle." I will not be here for a long time. When there is a shortage of fuel, break the unfinished barn"^[32]. Letters to relatives and representatives of local authorities permeated with concern for relatives: "I am sending a cash certificate for 600 rubles, which is valid until June 1942. Please send my mother 100 rubles. monthly. I will send the money that will remain with me, and you hand it over to the savings bank"; "You have to receive financial assistance from the village council^[33], because you are dependent on me. You have to get 100 rubles, because I get 150 rubles"; "You will receive help because we have three disabled people in the family. Make sure the village council doesn't let you through, because they may take you away"^[34]. The real will for his son, Igor, was the last letter of the quartermaster technician, chief of the main supply department of the front lines of the South-Western Front, quartermaster technician of the 3rd rank F. Chernikov on September 9, 1941: "My dear son! Your task in the fight against fascism is to study excellently. Your father protects his parents with a weapon, and you have to defend your studies and be an obedient, hard-working boy, to help your mother, grandmother and grandfather in this hard time"^[35].

Heavy military life was also reflected in the epistles of veterans: "… If you saw where I slept, you would probably shed tears for me. You have to sleep for 2-3 hours at night, and even then on damp ground, and sometimes in the water…"; "We haven't undressed or taken off our shoes for a month, we sleep outside dressed, constantly ready…". If in one part of the letters from the front the soldiers did not complain about food, in others, on the contrary, they complained about poor food: "They feed us well, three times a day. Eat as much bread as you want"; "The food is good, but, to my taste, everything is oversalted. There is an order that in addition to food we will be given 50 gramm of butter, 20 gramm of cookies and 50 gramm of fish products every day"; "I live like in a war: sometimes you eat some crackers or nothing, and sometimes they give everything hot, cooked in the field kitchen"^[36]. Quite often on the front line, especially when military units maneuvered, retreated or attacked, fought stubbornly, the quartermaster services objectively did not have time to provide the soldiers with quality hot food. There were serious shortcomings in the provision of Red Army personnel with shoes, underwear, tunics and overcoats ("We haven't been dressed yet, it's a pity I didn't take my jacket with me, because we sleep in our own clothes on the boards."; "There are a lot of soldiers here now, but still in their clothes. So they go to the guard and to classes: who is barefoot, who is in boots")^[37]. The health services did not carry out appropriate hygienic and disinfection measures, as a result of which mass infestation and infectious diseases were observed in many units.

Remaining indifferent and even negative towards the Stalinist regime, most Ukrainians wanted the Red Army to win, because their sons, brothers, husbands, and grandfathers served in it. n V. Doroshyn's epistolary we read: "Many people meet us, especially women, crying, and say that somewhere their relatives had been also taken away; we are treated to milk, bread, eggs, cigarettes and more, and there is water around each yard, - water and a mug…"^[3​8].

The threat of occupation of economically developed regions forced the allied leadership to resort to large-scale evacuation of industrial equipment, agricultural machinery and products, leading specialists and scientists in the eastern regions of the USSR. On June 24, 1941, the Council for Evacuation was established, headed by L.Kaganovich, and two days later Soviet authorities established the Republican Commission in the USSR with similar functions. On June 27, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the SNC of the USSR issued a resolution "On the Procedure for Exporting and Placing Human Contingents and Valuable Property," and on July 5, – a resolution "On the Procedure for Evacuating the Population in Wartime." According to these documents, the strategically important equipment of enterprises of military importance, engineers, designers, technicians, skilled workers, scientists, the creative elite, and the party-Soviet nomenklatura were subject to send to the east. Agricultural machinery and livestock were to be accompanied to the east by peasants specially designated by collective and state farms. The equipment of 550 largest industrial facilities of Ukraine with personnel, as well as about 3.5 million people were evacuated to remote regions of the USSR^[39]. Adhering to the "scorched earth strategy", the relevant Soviet structures systematically destroyed all material values that did not have time or could not be exported: industrial infrastructure, grain, raw materials, and so on. The authorities did not take care of tens of millions of ordinary citizens, in fact leaving them to their own devices. The Jewish community of Ukraine was under special threat. Documents show that already in 1939–40, Moscow knew in detail about the anti-Jewish actions of the Nazis on the territory of Poland, occupied by Germany, but did nothing to organize the evacuation of the Jewish population inland. We can assume that one of the motives for such an attitude to the problem was the fear of a surge of domestic anti-Semitism perturbed by the military trials of society. However, it seems more likely that the main reason was indifference to people of all nationalities, because the individual and his needs and interests in the Soviet value system were in the deep periphery. The government did not provide vehicles, routes or logistics to evacuate the civilian population.

In Ukrainian cities, immediately with the start of hostilities and during the evacuation, there were increasing disruptions in the supply of basic necessities and food. Students of Kamyanets-Podilsky Teachers' Training Institute, not receiving scholarships in time, did not have the opportunity to leave their homes after the exam session and buy food; "Scholarships have not been issued to us yet, I don't know when they will be. If there was money, maybe we would have been released home, and it is unknown when we will leave here"; "There are rumors that we will be released home, but when - it is unknown, because they have not yet given scholarships. Or maybe they won't let them go, because there is an order not to let anyone go anywhere, because we need people here to be paramedics and Anti-aircraft and anti-chemical warfare groups. I could walk just to get home. It is very difficult with food. You can't get black bread, only white bread for 2.70 (rubles), but no one has money. We live as we have to. You can't imagine this life"^[40]. "Occasionally products appear in stores," I. Khoroshunova, a resident of Kyiv, wrote in her diary in early August 1941.– Citizens roam the empty shops from morning till night in search of something edible. The city is eating up the remaining reserves. New products are not brought. Four items delight the eyes of people who go to the shops: cigarettes and crabs, Chinese pistachios and Soviet champagne". A month passed and an even more desperate entry appeared in the diary: "The food issue in the city is becoming more complicated. There is nothing in the shops. Empty counters and there are not even sellers. By the end of the day, sausages, sometimes raw and cold cutlets, appear in shops on Khreshchatyk. There is the murder there in such time. People stand in queues for 3-4 hours and often go out with nothing. There is no hunger. But approaching it with a terrible ghost appears before us. The only thing that can save us from it is that Kyiv will remain Soviet. Then there will be bread"^[4​1].

Vladimir Sergeyev, having survived the war and occupation, recalled: "Nobody announced anything to us. And evacuation was carried out selectively …. They had something for their people in the store. Maybe someone worked in the district committee^[42], some on the base, maybe a doctor or a lawyer. A small number of Jews were evacuated. Most people didn't have enough time for it. Some did not believe in cruelty, some could not leave their old parents. Some may have wanted to leave, but there was no opportunity. Everything was limited. Taken out mainly equipment of factories and plants. And the rest was subject to destruction. In general, they left us naked and barefoot"^[43]. Viktor Zaykovsky's interview emphasized that the population for the most part did not think about how they would live after the arrival of the Germans: "What they could, our people blew up during the departure. Elevators, grain. We survived by grinding the grain of burnt wheat. It can not be consumed, but we  ate"^[44].

With the arrival of German troops and the establishment of the occupation administration, the civilian population faced new challenges: finding work, sources to replenish the family budget, and avoiding Nazi terror.

Although on August 5, 1941, the Reich Minister of the Eastern Occupied Territories, A. Rosenberg, introduced compulsory labour for the local population, the problem of employment for hundreds of thousands of people was not solved. By the end of the autumn of 1941, 6.4 thousand unemployed metallurgists in Zaporizhia, about 144 thousand unemployed miners in the Donbas, and 100 thousand unemployed in Kharkiv were registered at labour exchanges^[45]. At the same time, the recruitment of "volunteers" to work in the industry and agriculture of the Reich began. Almost 100 young people left the western Ukrainian region for Germany by March 1942. But from other areas, Gastarbeiters had to be deported mostly forcibly and it led to massive passive and active resistance in various forms (concealment, self-harm, falsification of documents, escapes from assembly points and transportation routes, etc.)^[46], and a surge of anti-Nazi sentiment.

But the biggest test for Ukrainian society under the occupation of German and Romanian troops was the acute shortage of food. Seeing in Ukraine an inexhaustible reservoir of cheap agricultural products, able to meet the basic needs of the Wehrmacht and civilians of the Third Reich, Berlin from the first days of the occupation introduced a systematic withdrawal of agricultural grain. During the meeting at the Vostok Economic Headquarters, created specifically for the exploitation of Ukraine's agricultural resources, the following imperative was voiced: "If we can squeeze everything we need out of the country, then, of course, tens of millions of people will be doomed to starvation"^[47]. Hunger terror became one of the most important tools of the Nazi practice of depopulating Ukraine, which was to become a "living space" for the Germans. The implementation of this course was carried out through organized and spontaneous requisitions of agricultural products from the population and the maximum restriction of its consumer basket. During a meeting at the Reich Commissariat "Ukraine" on October 3, 1941, it was stated that each resident could consume no more than 1 kg of bread and 10-50 g of meat per week^[48].

In one of the letters of that time we read: "Zosia came from Kyiv region, she says that the villages there were destroyed, where there were houses, only pits remained. The people suffered a lot, it's scary to watch. Young people, old and children - all go and beg to give alms"^[49] .

To escape starvation, hundreds of thousands of citizens, grabbing clothes, shoes, household items that had at least some value, went to the "change" in the near and far tens or even hundreds of kilometres of the village. Louise Venediktova from Donbass mentioned that they went to the villages to get food in exchange for household items.Не всі селяни відкривали двері: "And we didn't even knock on the houses of the rich, because they didn't take people there for the night.... It's good that my mother had a lot of things. If it weren't for these things, we would, of course, starve to death"^[50]. In the memoirs of O. Goreva (Kyiv), it is said that her mother "changed everything that was at home - tablecloths, threads, paintings, linen. They left only the essentials. From the village she brought cheese, butter, milk, lard and here, in the city, she sold to buy bread, oil, potatoes for the money she received - the simplest food for the family"^[51].

Not taking into account the needs of the people (even rations and standardized issuance of products on the cards for workers did not cover the biological minimum of 2200 kcal.) the occupation administration continued to squeeze food out of Ukraine with maniacal insistence. By the end of 1941, German civilian and military authorities had seized more than 1 million tons of grain in Ukraine^[52]. Meanwhile in Kyiv till April 1, 1942, from hunger, cold and the illnesses caused by them from 80 to 120 thousand citizens died^[53]. Researcher of Kharkiv history during its German occupation A. Skorobogatov notes that the unprecedented famine for the city here began in December 1941: "To survive, people ate everything - bran, frozen fodder beets, potato peelings, pets, even casein glue, but nothing saved them. People began to swell, barely dragged their feet, starved deaths became widespread"^[54​]. According to the Kharkiv City Council, in the second half of December 1941 - the first half of December 1942, 13,139 people died of starvation^[55].

In general, the Nazi occupation policy caused a rapid change in the mood of the majority of the population of Ukraine from sympathetic or indifferent to anti-German.

Conclusions

Summarizing the above material, it should be stated:

1. Ukrainian society, both with the outbreak of World War II and in the initial period of the German-Soviet war, was not mentally homogeneous given the different political and socio-economic systems in those countries, which included Ukrainian enclaves in the 20- the 30s of the twentieth century. If in the Ukrainian SSR the Bolshevik ruling elite established a dictatorial regime and carried out a "socialist experiment" with the aim of continuous reformatting of social and economic relations in the absence of democratic freedoms and free market, then in interwar Poland and Romania there was political pluralism, private property and religious freedom. somewhat limited), which stimulated the personal autonomy of citizens and entrepreneurship. This created the basis for the formation of two Ukrainian communities, which differed in values, political sympathies, way of doing business, political and social practices. These circumstances determined the nature of political loyalty of Ukrainians - citizens of different states, the framework of social conformism/nonconformism, social activity and the ability to resist totalitarian regimes.

2. The forcible annexation of the territories of Poland and Romania, inhabited by a large number of ethnic Ukrainians, resulted in brutal methods of "Sovietization" of these regions: the establishment of the Soviet political and administrative system, the introduction of "socialist" economic relations (in the form of liquidation of private property and market relations). nationalization of land and industrial enterprises, collectivization of agriculture, etc.), persecution of opposition political forces, liquidation of public institutions, oppression of religious denominations, ideological unification and social homogenization. The local population mostly reacted sharply to the new order. It contributed to the formation of protest sentiments and the social base of the Ukrainian national liberation movement (mostly under the political slogans of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists).

3. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR were largely indoctrinated by the Bolshevik ideological apparatus, which implemented into the mass consciousness the basic postulates of "Stalinist socialism": "the advantages of the communist system over the capitalist", "the leading role of the Communist Party in the state", "party unity" inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR and the genius national policy of Stalin "," the invincibility of the Red Army "and others. At the same time in society, militaristic sentiments were spreading to legitimize the realization of the Kremlin expansionist geopolitical line. When the war broke out, the Union Center was unprepared to protect its citizens from destructive factors, to minimize human and material losses. Retrospective monitoring of the mood of the Red Army and civilians through the prism of ego sources and official bodies shows that simultaneously with the manifestations of Soviet patriotism there was mass defeatism and desertion, anti-Soviet statements, deviant and antisocial acts. The aggression of Germany and its allies against the USSR posed threats to Ukrainian society that it had not known before. The Nazi clique condemned the population of Ukraine to deportation, destructive exploitation, partial assimilation, and physical extermination. Berlin socio-economic program during the "campaign to the East" provided for the total withdrawal of agricultural products from Ukraine. It put local society on the brink of survival. Hundreds of thousands of residents of Ukrainian cities and villages have died of starvation and disease. The Nazi occupation terror provoked the anti-Nazi sentiments of the majority of Ukrainians, who resorted to active and passive forms of resistance to the policy of the invaders.

References

Aniskov, V.T. (2003). Krest'yanstvo protiv fashizma. 1941–1945. Istoriya i psixologiya podviga. Moskva: Pamyatniki istoricheskoj mysli. [in Russian].

Bordiugov, G. (2000). The Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union: Continuity and Change During the War. In R.W. Thurston, B. Bonwetsch (Ed.), The People's War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union. Urbana; Chicago. [in English].

Bordyugov G., & Buxaraev V. (1999). Nacional'nye istorii v revolyuciyax i konfliktax sovetskoj e'poxi. Moskva: AIRO-XX. [in Russian].

Branderberger, Devid. (2011). Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideologie, Indoctrination and Terror under Stalin, 1927–1941. New Haven–London: Yale University Press. [in English].

Brooks, J. (2000). Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [in English].

Buhai, M.F. (1990). Deportatsii naselennia z Ukrainy (30–50-ti rr.). Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 1, 37–42. [in Ukrainian].

Corner, P. (Еd). (2009). Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [in English].

Danylenko, V., & Kokin, S. (Comps.). (2013). Radianski orhany derzhavnoi bezpeky u 1939 chervni 1941 r.: dokumenty HDA SB Ukrainy. 2-e vyd., pererob. (Ch. 2, рр. 306–308, 318). Kyiv: Vyd. dim «Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia». [in Ukrainian].

Druzhba, O.V. (2000). Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna v soznanii sovetskogo i postsovetskogo obshhestva: dinamika predstavlenij ob istoricheskom proshlom. Rostov n/D: DGTU. [in Russian].

Golubev, A.V. (2008). «Esli mir obrushitsya na nashu Respubliku»: Sovetskoe obshhestvo i vneshnyaya ugroza v 1920–1940-e gody. Moskva: Kuchkovo pole. [in Russian].

Golubev, A.V., & Porshneva, O.S. (2012). Obraz soyuznika v soznanii rossijskogo obshhestva v kontekste mirovyx vojn. Moskva: Novyj xronograf. [in Russian].

Halchak, S., Pastushenko, T., & Shevchenko, M. (2011). Ukrainski robitnyky natsystskoi Nimechchyny: verbuvannia, prymusova pratsia, repatriatsiia. In V.A. Smolii (Ed.), Ukraina v Druhii svitovii viini: pohliad z ХХІ st. Istorychni narysy: U dvokh knyhakh (Vol. 2, p. 47). Kyiv: Nauk. Dumka. [in Ukrainian].

Hoffman, D.L. (2003). Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norm of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941. Ithaca NY and London: Cornell University Press. [in English].

Hrynevych, V. (2007). Suspilno-politychni nastroi naselennia Ukrainy v roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny (1939–1945 rr). Kyiv: IPEND. [in Ukrainian].

Hrynevych, V. (2012). Nepryborkane riznoholossia: Druha svitova viina i suspilno-politychni nastroi v Ukraini, 1939 – cherven 1941 rr. Kyiv; Dnipropetrovsk: Lira. [in Ukrainian].

Hrynevych, V. Nimetsko-radianska viina 1941–1945 rr. (2012). In V.I. Kucher (Ed.), Politychna istoriia Ukrainy. ХХІ stolittia: U 6 t. (Vol. 4: Ukraina u Druhii svitovii viini (1939–1945), рр. 129–304). Kyiv: Heneza. [in Ukrainian].

Jannsen, M., & Petrov, N. (2002). Stalin`s Loyal Executioner: People`s Cоmmissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895–1940. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. [in English].

Jones, Jeffrey W. (2008). Everyday Life and the «Reconstruction» of Soviet Russia during and after the Great Patriotic War, 1943–1948. Bloomington, Ind.: Slavica Publishers. [in English].

Kentii, V.A. (2005). Perekhid OUN(B) na antynimetski pozytsii (1941–1942). In S.V. Kulchytskyi (Ed.), Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv i Ukrainska povstanska armiia: Istorychni narysy. (рр. 88–112; 160–222). Kyiv: Naukova dumka. [in Ukrainian].

Kostenko, Yu. (2002). Moralno-psykholohichnyi stan Chervonoi armii v khodi pershykh boiv (cherven 1941 r.). Voienna istoriia, 3–4, 34–49. [in Ukrainian].

Kosyk, Volodymyr. (1993). Ukraina i Nimechchyna u Druhii svitovii viini. [per. z fr. R. Osadchuka]. Paryzh; Niu-York; Lviv: [b.v.]. [in Ukrainian].

Koval, M. (1999). Ukraina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii vitchyznianyi viinakh (1939–1945 rr.). T. 12. In V.A. Smolii (Ed.), Ukraina kriz viky. U 15-ty tt. (Vol. 22, pр. 221–222.). Kyiv:«Alternatyva». [in Ukrainian].

Koval, M.V. ( 1995). Ukraina: 1939–1945: Malovidomi i neprochytani storinky istorii. Kyiv: Vyshcha shkola. [in Ukrainian].

Koval, M.V. (1994). Ukraina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii Vitchyznianii viinakh (1939–1945 rr.): Sproba suchasnoho kontseptualnoho bachennia. Kyiv: In-t istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy. [in Ukrainian].

Koval, M.V. (1999). Druha svitova viina i Ukraina, 1939–1945: istoriosofski notatky. Kyiv: In-t istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy. [in Ukrainian].

Koval, M.V. (2001). 1941 rik. Problemy istorychnoi pamiati. Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 3, 69–91. [in Ukrainian].

Kuromiia, Hiroaki. (2002). Svoboda i teror u Donbasi: ukrainsko-rosiiske prykordonnia, 1870–1990-ti roky. per. z anhl.: H. Korian, & V. Aheiev. Kyiv: Osnovy. [in Ukrainian].

Kurylyshyn, K. (2010). Ukrainske zhyttia v umovakh nimetskoi okupatsii (1939–1944 rr.): za materialamy ukrainskoi lehalnoi presy: monohrafiia. Lviv: LNNB im. V. Stefanyka. [in Ukrainian].

Lehasova, L. (Ed.). (2012). Neprochytani lysty 41-ho: doslidzhennia, dokumenty, svidchennia. Kyiv: Aerostat. [in Ukrainian].

Lehasova, L. (Ed.). (2015). Ukraina. Viina. Vlasna pamiat: doslidzhennia, dokumenty, svidchennia. Kyiv: Aerostat. [in Ukrainian].

Lehasova, L., Kovalchuk, I., Stiazhkina, O., & Lysenko, O. (Ed.). (2021). Druha svitova. Rodynna pamiat. Kyiv. [in Ukrainian].

Lenoe, M. (2004). Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution and Soviet Newspapers. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press. [in English].

Lvivski visti. 1941. 13 lystopada, 3. [in Ukrainian].

Lysenko, O., & Pasichko, Ya. (2012). Pobut ta povsiakdennist radianskoi spilnoty kriz pryzmu epistoliarnykh dzherel. In L. Lehasova. (Ed.), Neprochytani lysty 41-ho: doslidzhennia, dokumenty, svidchennia. Kyiv: Aerostat, 2012. [in Ukrainian].

Malakov, D. (2006). Nezabutnie mynule Kyieva – u fotoalbomi «Kyiv. 1939–1945». Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 4 (583), 4–10 liutoho, 22. [in Ukrainian].

Mazur, G. (1999). Polityka radianskoi vlady shchodo naselennia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy v 1939–1941 rr.: sut i naslidky. Ukraina – Polshcha: vazhki pytannia. T. 4: Materialy IV Mizhnarodnoho seminaru istorykiv «Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny». Varshava, 8–10 zhovtnia, 1998 r. Varshava: Svitovyi soiuz voiniv Armii (рр. 91–108, 95). Kraiovoi, Obiednannia ukraintsiv u Polshchi: Tyrsa. [in Ukrainian].

Nahorna, L.P. (1997). Politychna kultura ukrainskoho narodu: istorychna retrospektyva i suchasni realii. Kyiv: Stylos. [in Ukrainian].

Naimark, N.M. (2011). Henotsydy Stalina. Per. z anhl. V. Starka. Kyiv: Kyievo-Mohylianska akadamiia. [in Ukrainian].

Nevezhin, V.A. (1997). Sindrom nastupatel'noj vojny. Sovetskaya propaganda v preddverii «svyashhennyx boev», 1939–1941 gg. Moskva: AIRO-XX. [in Russian].

Nevezhin, V.A. (2007). «Esli zavtra v poxod…». Podgotovka k vojne i ideologicheskaya propaganda v 30–40-x godax. Moskva: Yauza; E'ksmo. [in Russian].

Pankivskyi, K. (1965). Roky nimetskoi okupatsii. Niu-York; Toronto: [East side press]. [in Ukrainian].

Pastushenko, T. (2011). Doroha na skhid: evakuatsiina epopeia. In V.A. Smolii (Ed.), Ukraina v Druhii svitovii viini: pohliad z ХХІ st. Istorychni narysy: U dvokh knyhakh (Vol. 2, p. 496). Kyiv: Nauk. Dumka. [in Ukrainian].

Petrone, K. (2000). Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin. Bloomington, Ind. Indiana University Press. [in English].

Reshin, L.E. & Naumova V.P. (1998). 1941 god: V 2 kn. Moskva: Mezhdunar. fond «Demokratiya». [in Russian].

Siegelbaum, L., & Sokolov, A. (2000). Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. [in English].

Simperovych, Volodymyr. (2012). Liudyna v eks tremalnykh umovakh viiny: prosopohrafichnyi portret za epistolamy 1941 roku. In L. Lehasova (Ed.), Neprochytani lysty 41-ho: doslidzhennia, dokumenty, svidchennia. Kyiv: Aerostat. [in Ukrainian].

Skorobohatov, A.V. (2006). Kharkiv u chasy nimetskoi okupatsii (1941–1944). Kharkiv: Prapor. [in Ukrainian].

Skoropadenko, Z. (2002). Zakhidna Ukraina – Sybir. Khresnyi shliakh: roky 1939–1941. Den, 41, 2 bereznia. [in Ukrainian].

Smoliarchuk, N. (2012). Viiskovo-polova poshta v chervni-lypni 1941 roku. In L. Lehasova (Ed.), Neprochytani lysty 41-ho: doslidzhennia, dokumenty, svidchennia. Kyiv: Aerostat. [in Ukrainian].

Smolii, V.A. (Ed.) (2020). Ukraina v Druhii svitovii viini: pohliad z XXI st. Dokumenty i materialy. U dvokh chastynakh. (Vol. 1, p. 56). Kyiv: NVP «Vydavnytstvo "Naukova dumka", NAN Ukrainy». [in Ukrainian].

Snyder, Тimoty. (2010). Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books. [in English].

Starka, V.V. (2019). Povsiakdenne zhyttia zakhidnoukrainskoho sela v umovakh suspilnykh transformatsii 1939–1953 rr. Monohrafiia. Ternopil: Osadtsa Yu.V. [in Ukrainian].

Titarenko, D.N., & Penter, T. (Comps.). (2013). Opyt nacistskoj okkupacii v Donbasse: svidetel'stvuyut ochevidcy. Doneck: Svіt knigi. [in Russian].

Weiner, Amir. (2001). Making Sense of War: the Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. Prinston, N.J.: Princeton University Press. [in English].

Xoroshunova, I. Pervyj god vojny. Kievskie zapiski. 6, 7 avgusta 1941 g. Retrieved from http://www.judaica.kiev.ua/old/eg9/eg95.htm [in Russian].

Zabolotna, T. (2011). Zhyttia ta pobut miskoho naselennia naperedodni ta v roky okupatsii (1941–1944 rr.). In V.A. Smolii (Ed.), Ukraina v Druhii svitovii viini: pohliad z ХХІ st. Istorychni narysy: U dvokh knyhakh (Vol. 2, p. 16, 23). Kyiv: Nauk. Dumka. [in Ukrainian].

Вrovkin, V. (1998). Russia After Lenin: Politics, Culture and Society, 1921–1929. London: Routledge. [in English].

Ukraina. Viyna. Vlasna pamʺyatʹ: doslidzhennya, dokumenty, svidchennya / redkol: L.V. Lehasova (ker. proektu) ta in. Kyiv: Aerostat, 2015. S. 91.

Notas

^[1] Цит. за: 1941 год: В 2 кн. / Под ред. В.П.Наумова. Москва, 1998. С. 301–302.

^[2] Коваль М.В. Україна в Другій світовій і Великій Вітчизняній війнах (1939–1945 рр.): Спроба сучасного концептуального бачення. К., 1994; Його ж. Україна: 1939–1945: Маловідомі і непрочитані сторінки історії. Київ: Вища школа, 1995; Його ж. Друга світова війна і Україна, 1939–1945: історіософські нотатки. К., 1999; Його ж. Україна в Другій світовій і Великій Вітчизняній війнах (1939–1945 рр.). Т. 12. // Україна крізь віки. У 15-ти тт. / За заг. ред. В. Смолія. НАН України. Інститут історії України. Київ: «Альтернатива», 1999; Його ж. 1941 рік. Проблеми історичної пам'яті // Український історичний журнал. 2001. № 3.

^[3] Гриневич В. Німецько-радянська війна 1941–1945 рр. У кн.: Політична історія України. ХХ століття. Т.4. Україна у Другій світовій війні (1939–1945). К: Генеза, 2003. С. 129–304; Його ж. Суспільно-політичні настрої населення України в роки Другої світової війни (1939–1945 рр). К., 2007; Його ж. Неприборкане різноголосся: Друга світова війна і суспільно-політичні настрої в Україні, 1939 – червень 1941 рр. Київ-Дніпропетровськ, 2012.

^[4] Ніколаєць Ю., Костенко Ю. Морально-психологічний стан Червоної армії в ході перших боїв (червень 1941 р.) // Воєнна історія. 2002. № 3–4. С. 34–49.

^[5] Косик Володимир. Україна і Німеччина у Другій світовій війні / [пер. з фр. Р.Осадчука]. Париж; Нью-Йорк; Львів: [б.в.], 1993.

^[6] Snyder Тimoty. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books, 2010.

^[7] 1941 год: В 2 кн. / Под ред. В.П.Наумова. Москва, 1998; Голубев А.В. «Если мир обрушится на нашу Республику»: Советское общество и внешняя угроза в 1920–1940-е годы. М., 2008; Голубев А.В., Поршнева О.С. Образ союзника в сознании российского общества в контексте мировых войн. М., 2012; Дружба О.В. Великая Отечественная война в сознании советского и постсоветского общества: динамика представлений об историческом прошлом. Рн/Д, 2000; Невежин В.А. Синдром наступательной войны. Советская пропаганда в преддверии «священных боев», 1939–1941 гг. М., 1997; Он же. «Если завтра в поход…». Подготовка к войне и идеологическая пропаганда в 30–40-х годах. М., 2007; Бордюгов Г., Бухараев В. Национальные истории в революциях и конфликтах советской эпохи. – Москва, 1999.

^[8] Нагорна Л.П. Політична культура українського народу: історична ретроспектива і сучасні реалії. К., 1997; Вrovkin V. Russia After Lenin: Politics, Culture and Society, 1921–1929. – London, 1998; Brooks J. Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War. – Princeton, 2000; Bordiugov G. The Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union: Continuity and Change During the War // The People's War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union / Ed. R.W. Thurston, B. Bonwetsch. – Urbana; Chicago, 2000. Р. 54–70. Petrone K. Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin. – Bloomington, 2000; Hoffman D.L. Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norm of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941. – Ithaca; London, 2003; Stalinism as a Way of Life / Ed. L. Siegelbaum, A. Sokolov. – New Haven, 2000; Lenoe M. Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution and Soviet Newspapers. – Cambridge, 2004; Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism. / Еd. P. Corner. – Oxford, 2009 та інші.

^[9] Куромія Гіроакі. Свобода і терор у Донбасі: українсько-російське прикордоння, 1870–1990-ті роки. К.: Основи, 2002; Weiner Amir. Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. Prinston, N.j.: Princeton University Press, 2001; Branderberger Devid. Propaganda State in Crisis Soviet Ideologie, Indoctrination and Terror under Stalin, 192701941. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2011» Jones Jeffrey W. Everyday Life and the «Reconstruction» of Soviet Russia during and after the Great Patriotic War, 1943–1948. Bloomington, Ind.: Slavica Publishers,2008 та інші.

^[10] Непрочитані листи 41-го.. Дослідження, документи, свідчення. К., 2012.

^[11] Радянські органи державної безпеки у 1939 червні 1941 р.: документи ГДА СБ України /Упор. В.Даниленко, С.Кокін. 2-е вид., перероб. Ч.2. К: Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська академія», 2013. С. 306–308, 318.

^[12] Львівські вісті. 1941. 13 листопада. С. 3.

^[13] Старка В.В. Повсякденне життя західноукраїнського села в умовах суспільних трансформацій 1939–195  рр. Монографія. Тернопіль, 2019. С. 250.

^[14] Мазур Г. Політика радянської влади щодо населення Західної України в 1939–1941 рр.: суть і наслідки // Україна – Польща: важкі питання. Т.4: матеріали IV Міжнародного семінару істориків «Українсько-польські відносини під час Другої світової війни». – Варшава, 8–10 жовтня, 1998 р. – 1999. С. 91–108, С. 95.

^[15] Скоропаденко З. Західна Україна – Сибір. Хресний шлях: роки 1939–1941 // День. № 41. 2 березня 2002.

^[16] Наймарк Н.М. Геноциди Сталіна. / Пер. з англ. В.Старка. К.: Вид дім «Києво-Могилянська акадамія, 2011. С. 74.

^[17] Jannsen M., Petrov N. Stalin`s Loyal Executioner: People`s Cоmmissar Nikolai Ezov, 1895–1940 / Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 2002. P. 99.

^[18] Бугай М.Ф. Депортації населення з України (30–50-ті рр.) // Український історичний журнал. 1990. № 1. С. 37–42.

^[19] Друга світова. Родинна пам'ять / Національний музей історії України у Другій світовій війні. Меморіальний комплекс; редкол.: Л. Легасова (кер. проєкту), І. Ковальчук, О. Стяжкіна, О. Лисенко (науковий редактор), та ін. К., 2021. С. 58.

^[20] Україна в Другій світовій війні: погляд з XXI ст. Документи і матеріали. У двох частинах. Частина 1 / Ред.кол.: В.А.Смолій (голова колегії), О.В.Бажан, Г.В.Боряк, Т.В.Вронська, О.Є.Лисенко (заступник голови) та ін. К.: НВП «Видавництво "Наукова думка", НАН України», 2020. С. 56.

^[21] Цит. за: Косик В. Україна і Німеччина в Другій світовій війні. С. 487.

^[22] Там само. С. 489.

^[23] Кентій В.А. Перехід ОУН(Б) на антинімецькі позиції (1941–1942). У кн.: Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія. Історичні нариси. К.: Наукова думка, 2005. С. 88–112; 160–222.

^[24] Гриневич В.А. Суспільно-політичні настрої населення України в роки Другої світової війни (1939–1945 рр.). С. 294.

^[25] Там само. С. 301.

^[26] Політруки (комісари) – помічники командирів з політичної частини.

^[27] Друга світова війна. Родинна пам'ять. К., 2021. С. 21.

^[28] Смолярчук Н. Військово-польова пошта в червні-липні 1941 року. У кн.: Непрочитані листи 41-го…. С. 43.

^[29] Україна. Війна. Власна пам'ять: Дослідження, документи, свідчення. К., 2015. С. 91.

^[30] Даценко С., Погоріла Т. Фронтові листи 1941 року: музейний аспект. У кн.: Непрочитані листи 41-го… С. 27.

^[31] Там само. С. 26.

^[32] Лисенко О., Пасічко Я. Побут та повсякденність радянської спільноти крізь призму епістолярних джерел. У кн.: Непрочитані листи 41-го… С. 60.

^[33] Сільська Рада – місцевий орган влади.

^[34] Там само. С. 61.

^[35] Даценко С., Погоріла Т. Назв. праця. С. 28.

^[36] Лисенко О., Пасічко Я. Назв. праця. С. 61.

^[37] Там само. С. 62.

^[38] Сімперович Володимир. Людина в екс тремальних умовах війни: просопографічний портрет за епістолами 1941 року. У кн.: Непрочитані листи 41-го … С. 56.

^[39] Пастушенко Т. Дорога на схід: евакуаційна епопея. У кн.: Україна в Другій світовій війні: Погляд з ХХІ ст. Кн. друга. К.: Наукова думка, 2011. С. 496.

^[40] Лисенко О., Пасічко Я. Назв. праця. С. 63.

^[41] Хорошунова И. Первый год войны. Киевские записки. 6, 7 августа 1941 г. URL: http://www.judaicа.kiеv.ua/eg9/eg93.htm

^[42] Районний комітет Комуністичної партії.

^[43] Опыт нацистской оккупации в Донбассе: свидетельствуют очевидцы / Авт.сост. Д.Н.Титаренко, Т.Пентер. Донецк: Світ книги, 2013. С. 25.

^[44] Там само. С. 26.

^[45] Гальчак С., Пастушенко Т., Шевченко М. Українські робітники нацистської Німеччини: вербування, примусова праця, репатріація // Україна в Другій світовій війні: погляд з ХХІ ст. Історичні нариси: У двох книгах. Ред. кол.: В.А. Смолій (голова колегії), Г.В. Боряк, Ю.А. Левенець, В.М. Литвин, О.Є. Лисенко (відп. ред.) та ін. К.: Наук. думка, 2011. Кн. 2. С. 47.

^[46] Курилишин К. Українське життя в умовах німецької окупації (1939–1944 рр.): за матеріалами української легальної преси. Львів: ЛННБ ім. В.Стефаника, 2010. С. 204; Паньківський К. Роки німецької окупації. Нью-Йорк, 1965. С. 209.

^[47] Цит. за: Анисков В.Т. Крестьянство против фашизма. 1941–1945. История и психология подвига. М. ,2003. С. 254.

^[48] Заболотна Т. Життя та побут міського населення напередодні та в роки окупації (1941–1944 рр.) // Україна в Другій світовій війні: погляд з ХХІ ст. Історичні нариси: У двох книгах. К.: Наук. думка, 2011. Кн. 2. С. 16.

^[49] Лисенко О., Пасічко Я. Назв. праця. С. 63.

^[50] Опыт нацистской оккупации в Донбассе. С. 145.

^[51] Заболотна Т. Назв. праця. С. 23.

^[52] Коваль М. Україна в Другій світовій і Великій вітчизняний війнах (1939–1945 рр.). К., 1999. С. 221–222.

^[53] Малаков Д. Незабутнє минуле Києва – у фотоальбомі «Київ. 1939–1945» // Дзеркало тижня. 2006. № 4 (583) 4–10 лютого. С. 22.

^[54] Скоробогатов А.В. Харків у часи німецької окупації (1941–1944). Х., 2006. С 279.

^[55] Там само. С. 277–279.

IGOR VETROV

Ph.D. in History, Professor. Vice-rector of Humanities Faculties Education of the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. (Kyiv, Ukraine), vetrov@npu.edu.ua ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4830-741​

OLEKSANDR LYSENKO

Doctor of Historical Sciences (Dr. Hab. in History), Professor. Head of the Department of History of Ukraine During World War II, Institute of History of Ukraine NAS of Ukraine. (Kyiv, Ukraine), ukr2ww@ukr.net ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4003-6433

Descarregar este texto​