



Atlantic Centre Report n.1

ATLANTIC — CENTRE —

Mapping EU maritime
capacity-building in the Atlantic

Pedro Seabra and Rita Costa

December 2021

The Atlantic Centre is an initiative of the Portuguese Government, entrusted to the Ministry of Defence, and dedicated to the promotion of security and cooperation in the Atlantic, open to the participation of all states and organisations from this region. Its activities include the promotion of political dialogue, academic research and capacity-building in the field of security and defence.

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Published in 2021 by the Atlantic Centre.



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Foreward

Maritime security has become a central concern for the global economy, which relies heavily on sea routes to sustain a low-cost high consumption model of consumption at the global level. Raw materials also travel long distances towards the fast-developing economies in Asia and to suppress the needs of the technologically advanced economies of the Global North. Global trade security has driven many European nations, but also countries like Brazil or the United States to engage with the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which over the past years has remained the hotspot of piracy world-wide.

The European Union has established the Gulf of Guinea as its First Maritime Area of Interest and it has been elected at the picot case for its Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs). Approved during the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU, the CMPs promote the coordination of national naval assets being deployed in the region, to ensure round the year European presence as well as to ensure greater coordination of efforts and information-sharing. This is only one of the EU's last efforts to support maritime security in the Atlantic and in the Gulf of Guinea in particular.

This report sets forth a mapping exercise of EU funded projects that aim at building maritime capacity and fighting the threats of piracy, illegal and unregulated fishing, transnational organised crime and the illegal extraction of resources. Starting with the EU gives us an immediate advantage, as the EU is one of the most invested sponsors of maritime security in the Atlantic. European countries also rank high in terms of their bilateral cooperation and support to regional organisations. Also, Brazil has been actively involved in what be-came known as South-South cooperation, with African partners, but also cooperation with other southern American countries, like Argentina and Uruguay to address similar threats in their national waters.

Through this report, as well as subsequent ones, the Atlantic Centre is contributing to better knowledge regarding the existing projects and initiatives. This is something both recipient countries and donors alike have repeatedly highlighted as being much needed in order to make assistance more

effective for those on the ground. Such a contribution is truly in line with the Atlantic Centre's mission: to promote an Atlantic community of interests, to foster cooperative action and to work on the principle of complementarity. The report will certainly be useful in designing the capacity-building projects the Centre will develop in the future.

We hope the work presented in this report can be of use to all of those working on maritime security in the Atlantic in the South Atlantic.

Licinia Simão
Atlantic Centre Coordinator
December 2021

List of acronyms

ACP – Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries

ARSTM – *Académie régionale des sciences et techniques de la mer*

Camões, I.P. – *Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua*

CBSD – Capacity Building for Security and Development

CBRN – Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence

CCP – Global Container Control Program

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CMP – Coordinated Maritime Presences

COPOLAD I – Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Drugs Policies I

COPOLAD II – Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies II

COPOLAD III – Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies III

CRIMJUST – Strengthening criminal investigation and criminal justice along drug trafficking routes

CRIMGO – Critical Maritime Routes - Gulf of Guinea

CRIMSON – Critical Maritime Routes Programme Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism

CRP – Cocaine Route Programme

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

CVE – Countering Violent Extremism

DCB – Defence and Related Security Capacity Building

DCI – *Défense Conseil International*

DCI – Development Cooperation Instrument

DEVCO – Directorate-General International Cooperation and Development

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EDF – European Development Fund

EFCA – European Fisheries Control Agency

EIMS – ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy

EU – European Union

EUCAP – EU Capacity-Building Mission

EU-ECOWAS PSS – EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate

EUMSS – European Union Maritime Security Strategy

EPF – European Peace Facility

EUTF – European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

EUTM – EU Military Training Mission

FCWC – Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea

FIIAPP – Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies

Flagport WACAF – Support to Flag State Implementation and Port State Control in West and Central Africa

GIABA – Inter- Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa

GIFP – Global Illicit Flows Programme

GMCP-AO – Global Maritime Crime Programme on the Atlantic Ocean

GMCP-LAC – Global Maritime Crime Programme on Latin America and the Caribbean

GoGIN – Gulf of Guinea Inter-regional Network

IcSP – Instrument for Stability and Peace

IfS – Instrument for Stability

INTERPOL – International Criminal Police Organization

INTPA – Directorate-General International Partnerships

IPCOEA – Improvement of port customs and operation efficiency in Africa

IPSEA – Improvement of Port Safety and Efficiency in Africa

ISMI – *Institut de sécurité maritime interrégional*

IUU – Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

MARENDA – Support to the maritime transport sector in Africa: Development of port database interchange mechanism, marine environment protection and emergency response performance

MAI – Maritime Areas of Interest

MAICC – Maritime Area of Interest Coordination Cell

MIEUX – MIntegration EU eXpertise Initiative

M&E – Monitoring and evaluation

MSC – Monitoring, control and surveillance

NDICI – Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument

PASSMAR – Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central Africa

PESCAO – Programme for Improved Regional Fisheries Governance in Western Africa

PMAR GoG – Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risk Project

RIP – Regional Indicative Programme

RMU – Regional Maritime University

RUSI – Royal United Services Institute

SEACOP I – Seaport Cooperation Program I

SEACOP II – Seaport Cooperation Project II

SEACOP III – Seaport Cooperation Project III

SEACOP IV – Seaport Cooperation Project IV

SEACOP V – Seaport Cooperation Project V

SFA – Security force assistance

SOP – Standard Operating Procedures

SRFC – Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission

SSA – Security sector assistance

SSR – Security sector reform

SWAIMS – Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

WAPIS – West African Police Information System

WeCAPS – Improving Port Security in West and Central Africa

YARIS – Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System

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1. Introduction

The current security context in the Atlantic is often defined by the expansion of threats that lie within. In recent years, these threats have assumed an eminent maritime facet that reflects both the porosity of globalised connections and the fragilities of security sectors onshore, unable to extend their full control to national waters nearby. They have also routinely overlapped with different issue areas, forcing untested interconnections between such areas as law enforcement, economic development, and environmental protection, in parallel with a need for continuing investment on tackling more traditional security concerns. In turn, this has led to the display of a broad gamut of intersecting threats, ranging from pollution and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, to smuggling of narcotics and illicit weapons, human trafficking, illegal migration, piracy and armed robbery at sea, among others, all taking their toll on Atlantic shores.

The geographic focus of such perils has frequently swindled from East to West, but it has also come to find an expressive focal point in the Southern hemisphere. West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, in particular, have emerged as key hotspots alongside origin points of several transatlantic illicit flows in Latin American and Caribbean countries, further testifying to the fluidity of shared threats and to the underlying connectivity of oceanic spaces.

In this context, the need to build up and support local and regional capacity with the aim of providing both security and protection to natural resources, local communities and global commons alike has expanded significantly. To become an active provider in this domain has quickly turned into a natural rite of passage for a surging number of international and regional actors, including countries, international organizations, civil society and the private sector, all seeking to improve a perilous local security outlook. However, an increase in self-professed capacity-building provision has not necessarily been followed by adherence to a consensual definition of what can be effectively considered capacity-building *per se*. An overreliance on traditional assistance expertise in tandem with diverging external agendas has led to reduced uniformity in practice, increased meshing of competing activities, and a corresponding difficulty in reaching a full depiction of concurrent efforts.

The wide-ranging nature of the topic therefore requires delimitation in any attempt to map out existing or already completed initiatives. This report takes a first step in that direction by narrowing down the focus to **capacity-building with an explicit maritime component**, and by zooming in on **the role played by European Union (EU) between 2010 and 2021** as an external multilateral organization actively engaged with initiatives of the sort. Previous exercises have already advanced key recommendations on how EU officials may build upon lessons learned and improve further outreach (e.g. CRIMSON 2018; Deneckere et al. 2020). However, every mapping attempt has also remained grossly incomplete due to an ever-expanding portfolio of projects, in terms of both number, partners and issue areas addressed.

This report is grounded by three key objectives. First (1), it aims to provide an updated overview of EU involvement in the Atlantic, by mapping past and present capacity-building initiatives within such a space. Second (2), it adds a particular premium to comparable and verifiable information while ensuring it is made available for further studies on the topic. Third (3), it depicts key trends that illustrate the strengths and weaknesses faced thus far by European capacity-building efforts. **Assessments over the effectiveness of EU actions, however, will remain outside of the scope of research.**

The remaining of the content is structured as follows. The second section briefly tackles the ongoing debate over the capacity-building concept and recaps the official discourse the EU has adopted over the years in order to justify the expansion of its own *modus operandi* abroad. The third section elaborates on the methodology underpinning the bulk of this mapping exercise, including key criteria of analysis and main data sources. The fourth section concentrates on highlighting the main identifiable trends, together with single case-studies that merit special consideration in the broader discussion over the role of the EU in the Atlantic. We conclude by providing key takeaways that may inform and guide subsequent reports on the topic.

2. The EU and capacity-building

The following sub-sections concentrate on extracting the core elements of capacity-building as an operational concept used by the overall international community, and on providing a brief summary of its application by the EU amidst an expanding external agenda.

2.1. The concept of ‘capacity-building’

The ‘capacity-building’ terminology began to spread in the early 1990s, driven by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, keen on devising new modes of development assistance (Kaplan 2000; Venner 2015). **As it garnered further attention over its “fuzzword” status (Cornwall 2007), it also became prone to additional applications** in related domains. Ideally, capacity-building would allow to shift “the emphasis towards more fluid approaches to solve societal problems, relying on technology, knowledge and expertise rather than clearly stated objectives, one-size-fits-all solutions, and top-down approaches” (Bueger and Tholens 2021: 22).

Accordingly, **the emphasis on local ownership, shared liabilities and a small footprint have proven considerably enticing**. More so as capacity-building began to intersect with other related concepts, including security force assistance (SFA), security sector assistance (SSA), and security sector reform (SSR). In common, these approaches have advocated for the rationale that security and defence sectors of so-called fragile countries needed to be strengthened so that they can better deal on their own with incoming threats and thus reduce any need for permanent international assistance (Nilsson et al. 2011). Meanwhile, more recent contributions have argued in favour of perceiving capacity-building as encompassing “the building of new institutions, forms of coordination, writing of laws, creating of new forces, or training and enhancing existing ones, or the investment in new equipment, buildings, or vessels” (Bueger et al. 2021: 4).

However, **operationally, key multilateral actors have opted to translate these insights with little uniformity amongst one another**. UN peacekeeping operations, for instance, have co-opted

the capacity-building term, with little specification in their respective mandates (Wilén 2009). Organizations like NATO, on the other hand, began to structure external assistance in the form of a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative (Martinho 2020), but with little to no common guidelines in place.

2.2. State of the art on the EU

The EU's approach to capacity-building is closely intertwined with the evolution of its own external ambitions and foreign policy goals, namely the adoption of a more increased role as a global security provider. The European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003), elaborated in the aftermath of 9/11, recognized that, in a globalised world, external security threats undermined European internal security and that the EU should assume responsibility for global security. Nevertheless, the Strategy focused squarely on security in its neighbourhood: "We need both to think globally and to act locally" (Council of the European Union 2003: 8). Capacity-building was not approached in a comprehensive way, though security sector reform in the context of **broader institution-building** efforts was still mentioned as part of a possible expanded spectrum for future missions.

It was not until the publication of the Joint Communication entitled 'Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises' (European Commission 2015) that the issue gained new focus. This document delineates the overall dispositions on capacity-building and sets out the EU rationale for a **security-development nexus**, highlighting the need for adequate capacities to ensure security and development at the national and regional levels and its contribution to peace, stability, and crisis prevention. While the document falls short of delivering a concrete definition of capacity-building, it nonetheless details which activities should be considered as such, including "**access to international instruments, political dialogue, technical cooperation (including joint research and innovation), training (knowledge transfer and skills development) and the provision of essential equipment and material**" (European Commission 2015: 4). This was further reinforced by the European Union Global Strategy (European External Action Service 2016) which refers to capacity-building activities in various domains of action and across geographies, while also highlighting **security capacity-building in the context of CSDP missions**.

In parallel, significant efforts were made in terms of providing adequate funding for such expanding range of activities. Particular emphasis was assigned to the **Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)**, which had been originally designed for short-term support where a crisis is emerging or unfolding, and longer-term support to conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness activities as well as to address global and trans-regional threats. However, in recognition of legal obstacles in directly engaging with military sectors of partnering countries,¹ the EU added a new **Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD)** financial component to the IcSP in 2017, with the explicit aim of assisting military actors to perform development and human security-related tasks, under very restricted circumstances.

As expected, these broader developments resonated among more specific dimensions, including maritime security. In the 2007 EU Integrated Maritime Policy (European Commission 2007) and in the Atlantic Maritime Strategy (European Commission 2011), maritime security was essentially considered from an internal perspective, with the latter document mentioning capacity-building as a way to solely ensure trade and supplies. This would change, however, with the European Union Maritime Strategy (EUMSS) (Council of the European Union 2014a). Defining maritime security as “a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected” (Council of the European Union 2014a: 3), the Strategy highlighted key actions to achieve these goals, including **capacity-building activities in the fields of maritime governance and rule of law, port and maritime transport security, border management, and IUU fishing**.

The following EUMSS revised Action Plan (Council of the European Union 2018) took into account the June 2017 Council Conclusions on Global Maritime Security (Council of the European Union 2017) and the Communication on International Ocean Governance (European Commission 2016). The latter explicitly called for further activities to develop capacities and action number four,

¹ Article 41, no. 2 of Treaty on European Union prohibits ‘expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications’ from being charged to the EU budget.

in particular, proposed **capacity-building for better ocean governance and sustainable blue economies**, chiefly in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and Western Africa, as well as **security capacity-building with states and organizations**, especially in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and in the Indian Ocean.

The EUMSS revised Action Plan further enhances the role of capacity-building in maritime security beyond the EUMSS. On one hand, it **advocates for maritime security capacity-building in partnership with third countries and regional organizations** in a wide range of areas. On the other hand, it **calls for the strengthening of capacities of civilian and military actors in the maritime domain to contribute to sustainable development**. Capacity-building activities are also transversally present, through the proposal of **exercises, education and training activities** in nearly all the indicated maritime areas (Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Arctic).

It is also paramount to mention the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (Council of the European Union 2014b). Given the plethora of issues facing the region, capacity-building activities stand out in its respective Action Plan, which calls for “enhancing the capabilities of coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea to tackle the complex and wide ranging challenges of maritime insecurity, organised crime and IUU fishing activities” (Council of the European Union 2015: 16). Out of the four objectives defined in the GoG Strategy – all entailing capacity-building activities in some form – the second focuses on **helping regional governments put in place the institutions and capabilities to ensure security and the rule of law**.

Two other recent developments need to be highlighted. On the one hand, with its first pilot case launched in January 2021 in the Gulf of Guinea, the **Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP)** concept is the most recent display of EU involvement with maritime security. In line with the EUMSS and its Action Plan, the CMP aims to consolidate the EU’s Member States maritime actions, on a voluntary basis, by means of increased coordination and cooperation through the Maritime Area of Interest Coordination Cell (MAICC), created within the EU Military Staff. Due to its persistent maritime security issues, and in order to reinforce the EU’s and Member States’ efforts in the region, the GoG was established as a Maritime Area of Interest (MAI) and selected as the pilot case for the CMP. On the

other hand, the creation of both the **Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)** and the **European Peace Facility (EPF)** in 2021 already herald significant changes to the existing funding framework. **The former will absorb the IcSP in its entirety, while the latter will go beyond the CSDB purview** and directly support military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, Peace Support Operations, and capacity-building of partner countries.

Meanwhile, even though a complete assessment of each and every single EU-led activity launched under the capacity-building banner is beyond the scope of this report, existing literature has already begun to point to a **growing record of poor engagement with local actors** in complex political contexts (Edmunds et al. 2020; Jayasundara-Smits 2018) as well as recurrent “**struggles between programmers, by the actors in charge of its conduct (the actual interveners) and those targeted by it**” (Jeandesboz 2015: 444).

3. Methodology

The following sections elaborate on the methodological choices underpinning the data collection process. That entails the definition of key criteria substantiating the categorization of each EU-led initiative selected for the purpose of this report. Further details are also provided in terms of sources consulted on each identified project.

3.1. Selection criteria

Given the broad scope of the topic, several decisions were adopted with regard to data collection.² The first concerns a self-imposed delimitation to **projects with an underlined maritime component**. That option was taken in accordance to current priorities within the scope of Atlantic maritime

² See Annex I for a complete listing of EU capacity-building projects categorised under the proposed criteria.

governance as well as in order to ensure a common verifiable thread between all activities under analysis. Hence, only projects that integrated maritime traits in some form as part of their official mandate were accounted for in this exercise. This, in turn, led to considering different **Domains of Action** as entry points for each project, that went beyond traditional **Maritime Security** concerns and included areas such as **IUU fishing, Organised Crime, Cyber Security, Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) defence, Terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Critical infrastructure protection, and Illegal migration.**

Regardless of thematic preferences, the key challenge remained in the definition of capacity-building itself. As described in section 2.2, the **EU has avoided a strict definition of the concept**, choosing instead to advance possible activities that can routinely fall under the overall category (European Commission 2015: 4). This report abides by such loose dispositions and considers projects that envision capacity-building as pertaining to **training (knowledge transfer and skills development) and the provision of essential equipment and material.** However, in recognition that the topic may also go beyond such a narrow interpretation, projects with more specific thematic scopes in terms of their proposed activities, such as **Information sharing, Legal assessment and Support, Monitoring and Evaluation, Awareness Raising, and Surveillance,** are equally included. This meant multiple categorizations were admissible depending on the content and range of each project's formal mandate.

A different decision dealt with defining the measure of European involvement. Multiple EU member states are often engaged with capacity-building initiatives of their own in this very same region.³ Simultaneously, the EU is often called upon to fund *ad hoc* international initiatives towards capacity-building, including those promoted by other international agencies.⁴ For the purpose of this report, however, it was deemed more relevant to concentrate on projects in which the EU took a clearer lead, not only in terms of funding but also of corresponding programming and implementation.

³ Notable examples include France, Denmark, Portugal and pre-Brexit UK.

⁴ For instance, the Global Maritime Crime Programme is funded by the EU, among other donors, but is led by the UNODC. Even though they were not included in the mapping exercise, section 4.4 alludes to the importance of such initiatives for this discussion.

Data collected therefore accounted for which **EU Service** was or has been ultimately responsible for each project.

In terms of **Partnering State(s)**, the focus was set on capacity-building programs that targeted at least two different partners simultaneously, which means initiatives carried out by the EU in the framework of relations with individual countries were discarded.⁵ Given the extensive geographic limits of the South Atlantic, it also became important to differentiate between different **Geographical Scopes** whenever so required, namely in terms of **West Africa**, **Central Africa**, and **Latin America and Caribbean** with the purpose of highlighting possibly distinct sub-regional patterns emerging between **countries with Atlantic shorelines**. Landlocked countries or countries bordering other oceanic spaces but still covered by these projects were therefore not included.⁶ Meanwhile, the breadth of **Implementing partner(s)** brought in to design and execute concrete activities on the ground included the possibility of EU agencies, international and regional organizations, EU individual members states, NGOs and other civil society organizations.

As part of the timeframe of analysis, the **Implementation Start Date** ranged between 2010 and 2021, in a bid to cover a total of 11 years of EU engagement and match the peak of involvement from the international community with maritime security issues in the region.⁷ Inversely, the **Implementation End Date** was left open-handed, in order to account for differing **Status** of projects that were already completed or still remain ongoing.

Resource-wise, the report distinguishes between **Budget estimates** (>€30 M, €20-30 M €10-20 M, €5-10 M, €1-5 M, <€1 M) and concrete **Budget** amounts, in reflection of obstacles met in confirming final values for the full sample of projects selected. The choice of different **Financing instrument** available to the EU was also unpacked as well as the possibility of **Additional donors** that might

⁵ The MIgration EU eXpertise Initiative (MIEUX) Nigeria III, for instance, falls under such category.

⁶ Security capacity-building in the context of CSDP capacity-building missions, such as EU Training Missions (EUTMs) or EU Capacity-Building Missions (EUCAPs), comprises an important and underexplored dimension. However, none is currently active with any Atlantic country, hence their exclusion from this exercise.

⁷ Adopting this timeframe leads to the exclusion of the Seahorse Network, which ran between 2006 and 2008 and aimed to develop an effective policy to prevent illegal migration including trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants. It was implemented by Spain and targeted such countries as Mauritania, Morocco, Cape Verde and Senegal.

have directly contributed to each project in tandem with European funds. Finally, possible **Follow-up mechanisms** were accounted for, in a bid to incorporate mid-term assessments and their practical translation through subsequent adjustments or entirely new initiatives.

3.2. Sources and methodology

Data collection for this report primarily built upon the work carried out under the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities conducted in 2018 by the CRIMSON II project, particularly with regard to the creation of the CRIMSON database.⁸ This publicly available datasheet contains a list of EU maritime security initiatives, with information on timeline, budget, funding mechanisms and implementing partners. However, while useful on its own, this repository is also characterised by two significant shortcomings. On the one hand, it faces an evident lack of comparable data between stated categories, with noticeable instances of missing data, due to obstacles in accessing information pertaining to each and every single EU-led project. On the other hand, despite the stated aim to be “periodically fed by stakeholders and partners in order to improve clarity and coordination among the numerous maritime security actions”, it stopped being updated after 2018 onwards.

With the aim of overcoming these limitations and providing a more accurate and reliable portrait of the state of EU capacity-building provision, the following methodology was adopted. First, the original CRIMSON datasheet was thoroughly reviewed and streamlined in order to ensure an exclusive focus on projects concerning the geographic boundaries of the Atlantic as well as the selected timeframe. Each remaining entry was subsequently explored, revised and updated by accessing official documentation supporting its respective creation, planning, budgeting and revision (if completed within the selected time period). Additional entries were added over recent initiatives that fall under the proposed criteria. Multiple EU institutional and additional open access sources were consulted in order to achieve triangulation of results, whenever possible.⁹

⁸ Available at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VtVBi1MOkFHaulZsPgnRMvp51Myb1Sxy/view>

⁹ See Annex II for details on sources for each individual capacity-building project identified in this report.


4. EU capacity-building in the Atlantic: key trends

The following sub-sections elaborate on the main patterns identified from EU projects that focused on providing capacity-building to countries within the Atlantic region over the course of the 2010-2021 period. Particular emphasis is assigned to quantitative records, budget allocation, choice of partners, implementation options, and thematic preferences.

4.1. Number of projects


Following the adopted criteria, it was possible to map a total of 22 different projects that were brought forward between 2010 and 2021, with 2014 standing out as the year with the highest number of initiatives (4), as illustrated in Figure 1. There were no new projects that began in either 2015 or 2020.

Figure 1 – Evolution of EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per start year



The average length ranged **between 3 and 5 years**. In total, over the last decade, **only 3 initiatives crossed the five-year threshold as originally intended** (Figure 2). It is worth noting that, in this context, key projects have also managed to endure over time through different follow-up approaches to their original mandates. For example, while SEACOP has generated five consecutive formal iterations (SEACOP I, II, III, IV and V) and COPOLAD currently undergoes its third edition (following COPOLAD I and II), CRIMSON has come to pursue a three-phase programme over the course of its 14-year formal duration that is expected to run up to 2024.

Figure 2 – Average length of EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021)



However, these different timespans should be analysed with additional caution as EU programs often overextend beyond the formal end date stated in their mandates. The case of GoGIN comprises a case in point: despite initially foreseen to be completed by October 2020, it has remained in operation throughout the course of 2021 in order to ensure the effective implementation of its key tool, the YARIS system.

Box 1 - GoGIN

The **Gulf of Guinea Inter-regional Network** (GoGIN) project aims to improve maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. Funded by the **EU and Denmark** and implemented by **Expertise France**, the project covers 19 countries of the GoG region. Collaborating closely with other initiatives in the region, namely SWAIMS, PASSMAR and WeCAPS, GoGIN contributes to the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and process, by supporting the organizations and centres composing the Yaoundé architecture. In this regard, GoGIN is a direct follow-up to the Critical Maritime Routes - Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project. Its specific objectives are threefold: 1) Improving the collection, analysis and sharing of maritime information, particularly through the development and operationalization of the **Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System (YARIS)**; 2) Supporting maritime national organizations in the definition and implementation of their national maritime strategies and facilitating inter-agency collaboration; and 3) Supporting the full operationalization of the transnational maritime centres of the Yaoundé architecture. The YARIS platform stands out as the main instrument of this project. This maritime situational awareness tool has been operational since September 2020 and the training program on the platform has been taking place since January 2021 with encouraging results, reinforcing the added value of the overall platform.

4.2. Budget

A first depiction of budgeting trends associated with EU capacity-building in the Atlantic can be found in Figure 3. The bulk of funding estimates has varied between €1 and 5 million for a total of 10 projects over the course of eleven years, followed by 6 other projects that fell within the €5 to 10 million range.

Figure 3 – Budget estimates for EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per number of projects





Figure 4 depicts the graphic representation of budget allocation for every project per start year.¹⁰ In total, **between 2010 and 2021, the EU disbursed €185 million, with a peak in 2018 of €44 million.** The main destinations of these funds were concentrated on **SWAIMS (€29 million)**, **WAPIS (€28 million)** and **EU-ECOWAS PSS (€27 million)**.

¹⁰ Two projects, in particular, require clarification. On one hand, the budget for SEACOP III and IV was jointly set at first on €3M, but was subsequently increased to a total of €6M, i.e. the number that was used for the graphic display. On the other hand, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd phases of CRIMSON foresaw different amounts (€1M, €2M, and €2M, respectively), but only its total (€5M) was used for the purpose of this exercise.

Figure 4 – Budget allocation for EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per start year

Box 2 - SWAIMS


The **Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS)** project aims to improve maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea, in support of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS). To this end, the beneficiary states are **ECOWAS member states and Mauritania**. The project was created to suppress critical gaps that hinder the effective implementation of the EIMS and the Yaoundé Process. In this regard, the priority is set on **legal, operations and operational training, and communications and information technology (IT)**. While communications and IT concern GoGIN – which implies close coordination between the two projects – the remaining two correspond to the core areas of action of SWAIMS. The first regards **strengthening legal, governance and law enforcement frameworks**, in terms of improving prosecution and adjudication of maritime crimes, by establishing strong maritime policies, governance and institutions in Gulf of Guinea coastal States and developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main partner responsible for the implementation of this area of action. The second area concerns **strengthening law enforcement operational capacities and responses**. This objective is being pursued through several actions such as institutional and technical capacity building, strengthening regional training institutions and the involvement of civil society and

the private sector. These are implemented by key regional institutions such as the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), the *Académie régionale des sciences et techniques de la mer* (ARSTM), the *Institut de sécurité maritime interrégional* (ISMI), the Regional Maritime University (RMU), as well as *Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua* (Camões, I.P.), INTERPOL and the ECOWAS Commission.

Overall, funding was made available and channelled through multiple official instruments (Figure 5). **The Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP) took a clear lead in this regard, with a total of 10 projects**, all of which falling under article 5.¹¹ **None was funded under the CBSD component.** This was followed closely by the European Development Fund (EDF) with 8 projects (either through the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for West Africa or through the Intra-ACP Fund).¹² The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) through its thematic program on Latin America (3) as well as the former Instrument for Stability (IfS) (2) round up the list of main funding sources.

¹¹ According to the IcSP Regulation, actions can be structured around three operational articles: article 3, covering assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts; article 4, covering assistance for conflict prevention, peace building and crisis preparedness; and article 5, covering assistance to address global and trans-regional threats.

¹² Two cases warrant a specific note. On one hand, the duration of SEACOP II between 2012 and 2014 witnessed the formal transition from the IfS to the IcSP. On the other hand, the three phases of WAPIS were funded by three different sources: the first phase by IcSP, the second phase by the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), and the third phase by the 11th EDF.

Figure 5 – EU funding instruments for capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021)

Finally, even though the EU retained a central role in funding all the identified projects, it did not abhor the possibility of additional donors stepping in. For instance, in the case of GoGIN, out of the original €9,162 million budgeted for its full execution, €1,800 million were provided by Denmark.¹³ Likewise, the EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS) program foresaw a total of €29,330 million, to which ECOWAS itself contributed €2,330 million.¹⁴


¹³ This particular arrangement derives from Denmark's longstanding exemption from the defence-related aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), even though that has not stood in the way of occasional participation in CFSP initiatives of a more civilian nature.

¹⁴ IPCOEA also foresees a financial contribution by the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Secretariat, but funding has been exclusively covered by the EU thus far.

4.3. Partners

In terms of main selected partners, it is illustrative to distinguish between West and Central Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, in a bid to best depict the priorities of the EU for the Atlantic. In that sense, Figure 6 showcases the 10 main partners involved with EU initiatives in Africa.


Figure 6 – 10 main partners of EU-led capacity-building in West and Central Africa (2010-2021) per number of projects



Ghana (16), Togo (15), Benin (14), Cape Verde (14) and Senegal (14) make up the top five partners of the EU in the region, as the most frequent recipients of capacity-building projects. This was closely followed by such countries as **Sierra Leone (13), The Gambia (12), Nigeria (11), Guinea Bissau (11), and Côte d'Ivoire (11)**, who also routinely benefited from such initiatives.

Meanwhile, Figure 7 turns to Latin America and the Caribbean. In this case, the list of main partners is composed by small Caribbean states, such as **Antigua and Barbuda (5), Barbados (5), Dominican Republic (5), Grenada (5), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (5), Saint Lucia (5), Trinidad and Tobago (5), and Saint Kitts and Nevis (5)**. That is followed by countries with considerably more material capacities of their own, such as **Argentina (4) or Brazil (4)**.

Figure 7 – 10 main partners of EU-led capacity-building in Latin America and the Caribbean (2010-2021) per number of projects



A final mention is also owed in terms of the **reduced number of projects that simultaneously encompass countries from West and Central Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean**. From the total of 22 initiatives analysed in this report, only SEACOP can be labelled as an actual Atlantic initiative, that considers broad oceanic linkages in tackling shared security threats and includes partners from both margins in its envisioned activities.

Box 3 - SEACOP

The **Seaport Cooperation Project (SEACOP)** aims to support the fight against illicit maritime trade and associated criminal networks through the provision of necessary means, such as **equipment and training**, to the institutions of beneficiary states. This project **targets one of the main illicit flow routes of the Atlantic, which starts in Latin America and reaches Europe through the Caribbean and West Africa**. This route is also targeted by other projects such as the EU-funded AIRCOP and UNODC-WCO Global Container Control Program (CCP), which are considered important stakeholders for SEACOP. Currently in its fifth phase, since its inception in 2010, SEACOP has broadened both geographically and in terms of scope

of action, with an approach adapted to better match the reality of transnational criminal networks. Geographically, during its first phase, the project was implemented in three West African countries, and was gradually enlarged until its current configuration as a **transcontinental Atlantic initiative**, including 22 countries from both shores. This enlargement allows SEACOP to target all the regions affected by illicit flows and prevent the displacement of criminal activities to other regions. Regarding the scope of action, it has moved beyond its **initial focus on drug trafficking** to also address **illicit trade and transnational organised crime** more comprehensively. Considering that the project was initially part of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP), which in 2019 was replaced by the broader Global Illicit Flows Programme (GIFP), it is possible to observe that the changes in the project's aim reflect a wider change of paradigm in the fight against transnational organised crime within the EU.


4.4. Execution

This category is unpacked from two different angles, in terms of the official bodies supervising the disbursement of funds and ensuring accountability of results, and in terms of the entities entrusted with leading the actual implementation of the project in question. On the first domain, consecutive organizational changes within the EU hinder more substantial mapping efforts.¹⁵ Regardless, Figure 8 still evidences the **unmistakable centrality of the European Commission through DEVCO and, more recently, INTPA**. In particular, the B.5 – Directorate Peace and People / Security, Nuclear Safety Unit within DEVCO was, at one point, directly managing a total of 8 different projects. It is not clear how many of those projects that are still ongoing have been distributed through similar thematic units within the new INTPA organigram.¹⁶

¹⁵ The previous Directorate-General on Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid (DEVCO) resulted from the merger of former DG's of EuropeAid (AIDCO) and Development (DEV) and took lead point on capacity-building initiatives between 2011 and 2014. It was then renamed DG International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) in 2015 and afterwards, DG International Partnerships (INTPA) in 2021.


¹⁶ Despite formally falling under the umbrella of INTPA units, some projects are also sometimes directly managed by EU representations on the ground. That is the case with PASSMAR and the EU Delegation in Gabon, and WAPIS and the EU delegation in Côte d'Ivoire.

Figure 8 – EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per EU service responsible



On the second dimension, the pool of institutions that collaborates with the EU or is sub-contracted for the operationalization of expected capacity-building results is considerably wider. Figure 9 showcases the clear lead of the **International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP)**, followed by an assortment of international organizations (ECOWAS, UNODC, INTERPOL) and national specialised agencies (Expertise France, CIVPOL, PJ, SOCA, ADETEF, FCI). However, this ranking is not illustrative enough of the complete set of partners the EU has engaged with in trying to launch these projects off the ground. That number runs to a total **57 different institutional partners** and includes a variety of other **private contractors, civil society organizations, national and international public bodies**.

Figure 9 – 10 main implementing partners of EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per number of projects




One example in this sample requires particular attention. Contrary to all the projects who were or have been consistently implemented by the same partner since inception to completion, the different phases for the implementation of CRIMSON have been led by different institutions: from 2011 to 2014, the task was first assigned to the *Défense Conseil International* (DCI), whereas from 2015 to 2019 (phase 2) and from 2020 to 2024 (phase 3), it was entrusted to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

Finally, although not a part of this mapping exercise, alternative partnering venues for the EU should also be brought up. Namely, the **Global Maritime Crime Programme** – either through its iteration on the Atlantic Ocean (GMCP-AO) or on Latin America and the Caribbean (GMCP-LAC) – and the **Strengthening criminal investigation and criminal justice along drug trafficking routes (CRIMJUST)**. Both are led by UNDOC and provide legal assessment and support and information sharing as part of their capacity-building initiatives towards multiple countries in West, Central and Southern Africa as well in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, in both cases, the EU is essentially restricted to a funding role, in the context of other international actors (including EU member states), hence why they are not presented on the same playing field as the remaining projects.

4.5. Areas of focus

Out of the 22 identified projects, **only 6 exclusively focused on maritime security**. One focuses on IUU fishing and 5 on critical infrastructure protection. However, the core domain of action comprises **organised crime** (Figure 10), with 11 projects in total assuming such a thematic emphasis.¹⁷


Figure 10 – Domains of action of EU capacity-building in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per number of projects



Geographically-speaking, two trends emerge on Figure 11. On the one hand, **African countries absorb all initiatives focused on maritime security, IUU fishing and critical infrastructure protection**; whereas partners in **Latin America and the Caribbean** solely received capacity explicitly concerned with issues of **organised crime**. On the other hand, the fact that certain categories evidence negligible interest attests to the significance of projects that are nonetheless labelled as such, like PESCAO and IUU fishing.

¹⁷ As mentioned in section 2.2., multiple categorizations were deemed admissible in recognition of broad dispositions in each project's mandate. Hence, IPCOEA was labelled as pertaining both to Critical Infrastructure protection and Organised Crime.

Figure 11 – Percentage of domains of action of EU capacity-building in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per sub-region




Box 4 - PESCAO

The **Programme for Improved Regional Fisheries Governance in Western Africa (PESCAO)** aims to **promote regional fisheries governance in Western Africa through better coordination of national fisheries policies**, in order to contribute to sustainable development, food security and poverty alleviation in the West Africa region. To this end, the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), the ECOWAS Commission and sub-regional fisheries organizations, namely the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC), and the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) jointly collaborate in the project's components: 1) Development of a framework for regional fisheries priorities and better cooperation; 2) Capacity building of national and regional monitoring, control and surveillance (MSC) authorities to hinder IUU fishing; and 3) Promotion of coordination for shared fisheries management. This project complements the various initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea region by **addressing IUU fishing, identified as a threat to the region on the EU's Gulf of Guinea Strategy**. With sustainable development as its ultimate objective, PESCAO also addresses a **security-development nexus** as it seeks to improve root causes of maritime insecurity in the region, thus contributing to the integrated approach of the EU.

However, it should be highlighted how the inclusion of projects with only a minor maritime component can distort the results under analysis. For instance, EU-ECOWAS PSS is primarily focused on supporting ECOWAS to execute its conflict prevention and resolution mandate and to build up the ECOWAS Peace Fund as well as the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department; **maritime security comprises only a fraction of its envisioned activities**. Likewise, COPOLAD aims to reduce drugs supply and demand across Latin America and the Caribbean and ultimately reduce the social and health-related risks and harms caused by drug use; **maritime-related activities, while existent, are not the main concern**.

Meanwhile, bearing in mind the criteria advanced in section 3.1, the nature of most activities foreseen in each project can be labelled as falling under those that the EU itself considers more often as pertaining to capacity-building (European Commission 2015: 4).¹⁸ A total of 17 projects concern **broad capacity-building**, due to the predominance of such items as **training** (knowledge transfer and skills development) and the **provision of essential equipment and material**. Other 11 projects directly focus on improving **information-sharing** with targeted partners (Figure 12).


Figure 12 – Nature of the action of EU capacity-building in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per number of projects



¹⁸ Similar to Figure 10, multiple categorizations were deemed admissible in recognition of broad dispositions in each project's mandate. Only 10 projects were labelled with a single category, namely IPCOEA, IPSEA, Flagport WACAF, MAREDA, EU-ECOWAS PSS, WAPIS, PMAR GoG and COPOLAD I, II and III.

From a geographic point of view, it is also possible to observe similar issue silos in terms of Africa and Latin America and Caribbean. The former accounts for nearly all the instances in which more sub-thematic activities were made explicit from the start, going beyond the general mantle of train-and-equip alone.

Figure 13 – Percentage of natures of action of EU capacity-building in the Atlantic (2010-2021) per sub-region



5. Main takeaways

- The role of the EU as a maritime capacity-building provider in the Atlantic has increased considerably, evidenced by a total of **22 projects** deployed over the course of a decade, while supported by an investment of **€185 million**. These figures unmistakably substantiate the notion of an **expanded specialised tool-box, which bring the EU on par with efforts from other international actors**, equally engaged in the region.
- However, **a clear priority ascribed to the security-development nexus** amidst the EU official discourse on capacity-building **does not find close correspondence with the existing set of**

projects. In fact, few can be considered to tackle development issues, and by inherence, the root causes of regional insecurity – with the notable exception of PESCAO. Likewise, a **maritime component is not necessarily the most visible or important trait amidst each project's mandate**, thus highlighting a gap between recent formal developments that push the EU to assume a greater maritime role and their effective translation into practice.

- **Ghana and Togo** in West Africa, and small island nations like **Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados** in the Caribbean, stand out as top recurrent partners for the EU. Yet, **there is little evidence of a systematized effort to consider an Atlantic purview in existing projects.** The SEACOP case warrants particular follow-up as new capacity-building projects may seek to emulate its structure and encompass multiple points of origin and/or transit under one single common framework.
- Lingering formal tensions between an EU focus on development and security capacity-building are also reflected in the variety of funding mechanisms available. Even though not primarily covered by this report due to their novelty, **the creation of the EPF and the absorption of the IcSP by the NDICI** are bound to scramble this equation and further push the boundaries of the capacity-building concept as well as the activities envisioned within its fold.
- The lack of an official EU definition has permeated down to the design of each project's mandate and is reflected by the **operative hold of capacity-building as training** (knowledge transfer and skills development) and the **provision of essential equipment and material**, as the core of what the EU is able to provide to its partners abroad.
- **The EU capacity-building architecture is based upon an extensive but rather disconnected network of implementation partners** that range from international organizations and national specialised agencies to private contractors and civil society organizations, and who are ultimately responsible for ensuring outcomes and concrete results to each assigned project.
- **Mapping exercises would be facilitated by an increased transparency and openness over data concerning each initiative.** 'Action fiche/Action documents' are not made available for

most of the projects included in this report. Mid-term and final reports for projects already concluded remain even more elusive. This compromises any aim of reaching a full depiction of the current regional context, and **hinders not only the identification of synergies and duplication of efforts, but also potential assessments of effectiveness behind EU actions.**

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7. Annexes

The following annexes provide a complete depiction of EU capacity-building provision as well as a listing of additional sources for corroboration of data validity.

7.1. Annex 1 – List of EU capacity-building projects in the Atlantic

Project/Action	EU Service Responsible	Partnering State(s)	Implementing partner(s)	Start Date	End Date	Status	Financing instrument	Additional donors	Budget estimates (> €30 M, €20-30 M, €10-20 M, €5-10 M, €1-5 M, < €1 M)	Budget (€)	Geographical Scope (West Africa, Central Africa, Latin America and Caribbean)	Domain of Action (Maritime Security, IUU fishing, Organised Crime, Cyber Security, CBRN, Terrorism, CVE, Critical infrastructure protection, Illegal migration, other)	Nature of the Action (Information sharing, Legal assessment and support, Monitoring and evaluation, Capacity-building, Awareness raising, Surveillance)	Follow-up mechanisms
Seaport Cooperation Program I (SEACOP I)	DG DEVCO B5 (CRP)	Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal	Consortium led by FIIAPP - also includes SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), FCI (FR), CIVIPOL (FR), PJ (PT)	2010	2012	Completed	IfS	No	1-5 M	3 M	West Africa	Organised crime	Capacity-building, Information sharing	SEACOP II

Seaport Cooperation Project II (SEACOP II)	DG DEVCO B5 (CRP)	Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia	Consortium led by FIIAPP - also includes SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), FCI (FR), CIVIPOL (FR), PJ (PT)	2012	2014	Completed	IfS/ IcSP (Article 5)	No			West Africa	Organised Crime	Capacity-building, Information sharing	SEACOP III
Seaport Cooperation Project III (SEACOP III)	DG DEVCO B5 (CRP)	Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Benin, Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Kitts and Nevis	FIIAPP	2014	2017	Completed	IsCP (Article 5)	No	5-10 M	6 M	West Africa; Latin America and Caribbean	Organised crime	Capacity-building, Information sharing	SEACOP IV
Seaport Cooperation Project IV (SEACOP IV)	DG DEVCO B5 (CRP)		FIIAPP	2017	2020	Completed	IsCP (Article 5)	No			West Africa; Latin America and Caribbean	Organised crime	Capacity-building, Information sharing	SEACOP V
Seaport Cooperation Project V (SEACOP V)	DG DEVCO B5 (GIFP)	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Colombia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago	Consortium led by Expertise France in partnership with FIIAPP - also includes CIVIPOL (FR), PJ (PT), UKBF (UK), DGDDI (FR), DCSD (FR), MAOC(N), NCA (UK), FRONTEX	2021	2023	Ongoing	IsCP (Article 5)	No	1-5 M	5 M	West Africa; Latin America and Caribbean	Organised crime	Capacity-building, Information sharing	-
Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Drugs Policies I	DG DEVCO G2	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,	DGPNSD, FIIAPP, CICO, SEDRONAR, SENAD, SENDA, DEVIDA, JND, MILDT, GIZ, IDT, ICD, Con-	2011	2015	Completed	DCI RIP LA (2007-2013)	No	5-10 M	6,6 M	Latin America and Caribbean	Organised crime	Capacity-building	COPOLAD II

(COPOLAD I)		Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela	sejo CONSEP, CONADIC, PCB, ANA, CI-CAD, EMCDDA, IDPC, PAHO, RIOD											
Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies II (COPOLAD II)	DG DEVCO G2	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela	FIIAPP	2016	2020	Completed	DCI RIP LA (2014-2020)	No	5-10 M	10 M	Latin America and Caribbean	Organised Crime	Capacity-building	COPOLAD III
Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies III (COPOLAD III)	INTPA B.2	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Rep., Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad	FIIAPP	2021	2025	Ongoing	DCI RIP LA (2014-2020)	No	10-20 M	15 M	Latin America and Caribbean	Organised Crime	Capacity-building	-

		and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela												
CMR Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism (CRIMSON)	DG DEVCO B5 (CMRP)	Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, UAE, Yemen, Djibouti, Senegal, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Guinea, Cameroon, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia	Défense Conseil International (DCI) - phase 1 (2011-2014) Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) - phase 2 (2015-2019) and 3 (2020-2024)	2011	2024	Ongoing	IcSP (Article 5)	No	1-5 M	5 M	West Africa; Central Africa; Indian Ocean	Maritime Security	Monitoring and evaluation	-
Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risk Project (PMAR GoG)	DG DEVCO B5	Senegal, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, DRC, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Angola	JRC	2011	2013	Completed	EC	No	1-5 M	1 M	West Africa; Central Africa	Maritime Security	Surveillance	-
West African Police Information System (WAPIS)	INTPA A.2	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritania	INTERPOL, ECOWAS	2012	2022	Ongoing	I phase: IcSP II phase: EUTF III phase: 11th EDF (RIP WA)	No	20-30 M	28 M	West Africa	Organised Crime	Information sharing	AFIS

EU Support to ECO-WAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS)	DG DEVCO E2	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo	ECOWAS, UNDP, UNODC	2013	2019	Completed	10th EDF (RIP WA)	Yes	20-30 M	29,330 M (2,330 M from ECO-WAS)	West Africa	Organised crime	Capacity-building	-
Critical Maritime Routes - Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO)	DG DEVCO B5 (CMRP)	Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tom and Principe, Gabon	Expertise France	2013	2016	Completed	IcSP (Article 5)	No	1-5 M	4,5 M	West Africa	Maritime Security	Capacity-building, Information sharing	GoGIN
Gulf of Guinea Inter-regional Network (GoGIN)	DG DEVCO B5 (CMRP)	Senegal, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Guinea, Cameroon, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia	Expertise France	2016	2021	Ongoing	IcSP (Article 5)	Yes	5-10 M	9,162 M (1,800 M from DK)	West Africa; Central Africa	Maritime Security	Capacity-building, Information sharing, Legal assessment and support	-
Support to the maritime transport sector in Africa: Development of port database interchange mechanism, marine environment protection and emergency response performance (MARENDA)	DG DEVCO E3 - ACP Secretariat	Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire	CETMAR, TEIRLOG Ingenieria S.A., Grupo Mecanica del Vuelo Sistemas S.A.U., Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canarias	2014	2016	Completed	10th EDF (Intra ACP)	No	1-5 M	2,1 M	West Africa; Central Africa	Critical Infrastructure Protection	Information sharing	-

Support to Flag State Implementation and Port State Control in West and Central Africa (Flagport WACAF)	DG DEVCO E3 – ACP Secretariat	Angola, Benin, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo	IMO	2014	2016	Completed	10 th EDF (Intra ACP)	No	1-5 M	1,2 M	West Africa; Central Africa	Critical Infrastructure Protection	Capacity-building	-
Improvement of Port Safety and Efficiency in Africa (IPSEA)	DG DEVCO E3 - ACP Secretariat	Ghana, Congo Brazzaville, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon	AIMM-IMSSEA Consortium	2014	2016	Completed	10th EDF (Intra ACP)	No	< 1M	860.000	West Africa; Central Africa	Critical Infrastructure Protection	Capacity-building	-
Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS)	DG DEVCO E2	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritania	UNODC, INTERPOL, Camões I.P., ECOWAS, GIABA, ARSTM/ISMI, RMU	2018	2023	Ongoing	11th EDF (RIP –WA)	No	20-30 M	29 M	West Africa	Maritime Security	Capacity-building, Legal assessment and support	-
Programme for Improved Regional Fisheries Governance in Western Africa (PESCAO)	DG DEVCO C1	Benin, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo	ECOWAS SRFC, FCWC, EFCA	2018	2022	Ongoing	10th EDF (RIP WA)	No	10-20 M	15 M	West Africa	IUU fishing	Capacity-building, Awareness raising	-
Improvement of port customs and operation efficiency in Africa (IPCOEA)	INTPA E.2	Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone	FAIMM, ARSTM, PMAWCA	2019	2021	Ongoing	IsCP (Article 5)	Yes	1-5 M	1,88 M	West Africa	Critical Infrastructure protection, Organised Crime	Capacity-building	-

Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central Africa (PASSMAR)	INTPA A.4	Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe	UNODC, DAI	2019	2023	Ongoing	11th EDF (RIP)	No	5-10 M	10 M	Central Africa	Maritime Security	Legal assessment and support, Awareness raising, Information sharing	-
Improving Port Security in West and Central Africa (WeCAPS)	FPI.1	Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo	Expertise France	2019	2022	Ongoing	IsCP (Article 5)	No	5-10 M	8,5 M	West Africa; Central Africa	Critical Infrastructure Protection	Capacity-Building	-

7.2. Annex 2 – Data sources

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
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