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THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MISSION OF THE CIVIL GUARD: PORTUGAL, 1847

Alberto RICO SÁNCHEZ (Spain)

Abstract

The Civil Guard, since its foundation in the reign of Isabel II, was used as an important piece in enhancing the international prestige of Spain. The first participation of the Civil Guard outside our borders took place in Portugal in 1847. The signing of an international treaty to quell a serious revolt and support Queen María II meant the entry of a Spanish army corps into Portugal. On the own initiative of Francisco Javier Girón, Duke of Ahumada, leader of the Civil Guard, and on the imminent departure of the expeditionary army to Portugal, the Royal Order of June 7th, 1847, was approved, which approved the tasks of the Civil Guard in its campaign service. The human resources contributed by the Civil Guard to the expedition were a total of forty-three men from the cavalry section under the command of Captain Francisco Aguirre. He would oversee guaranteeing security on the streets of the city of Porto. Those civil guards contributed to creating security structures that would be imitated, targeting the lives and properties of their citizens. After the fall of Porto on June 30, the Civil Guard established a patrol service to guarantee the security of the city. In July, the troops withdrew, and the Civil Guard participated in the international recognition for its contribution to the campaign, very few years after its founding. Pacification was achieved through the Treaty of Gramido of 1847, reaffirming María II on the Lusitanian throne.

Keywords: Civil Guard, Liberalism, Porto, Portugal, Spain.

Introduction

Portuguese liberalism, like Spanish liberalism, was born divided between progressives (vintistas and septembristas) and conservatives (chartists or moderates). The former advocated the Constitution (of 1822 and 1838, respectively), while the latter advocated the Charter of 1826. The ultra-conservative wing of Chartism was Cabralism (led by Costa Cabral, Count of Thomar), to which the preferences of Queen María II. This considered the Porto uprising and the civil war. In October 1846, the queen handed over power to the Marquis of Saldanha, who formed a Chartist-Cabralist government contrary to the liberal principles imposed by a popular insurrection that occurred several months earlier called "María da Fonte". In this way the Crown was seriously compromised, facing most of the country, which was organized into Juntas. The most important, that of Porto, brought together the opposition to the new ministry. The resistance of a large part of the country opened a civil war known as *Patuleia*⁽¹⁾. Throughout it, María II was reluctant to reconcile the rebels. These had to be submitted. The September support, the majority party in the Porto Junta, for the Spanish Progressive Party and the Carlist problem moved the Madrid government to adopt a highly active stance in solving the crisis. Portugal demanded aid under the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, to which it belonged⁽²⁾. The United Kingdom considered the war as a fight between Portuguese parties that did not question the dynasty. He considered the aforementioned treaty fulfilled. Palmerston proposed bases for mediation in Portugal.

Spain demanded to take part in the pacification process. First in mediation. If this failed, in the intervention. The bases of mediation were accepted by the Portuguese government, but not by the Porto Junta. The London Protocol of May 21, 1847, decided on an intervention that would restore constitutional normality, subduing those in arms against the queen and separating from power those who justified the insurrection with their abuses. Such is the framework in which the political and diplomatic battle of the intervention takes place. Spain would have a special role. I would collaborate by sea and land. A second Protocol signed in Madrid on May 31 established the Spanish intervention land forces and their entry into Portugal. Spanish diplomacy thus achieved a leading role in the resolution of the Portuguese question. At the time of closing the crisis, two places, Porto and Lisbon, and two negotiating tables, that of the military and that of the heads of legation. Concha and Wylde in the first, Ayllón, Seymour and Varenne in the second. Two documents bore fruit: the Gramido convention and the Lisbon protocol of July 2, 1847.

1. Fernando Correia Pina, *Da Maria da Fonte à Patuleia. Um diario da guerra civil no distrito de Portalegre*. Portalegre: 2015, 5.

2. José María Jover Zamora, *La era isabelina y el Sexenio Democrático*. Barcelona: RBA, 2005.

The spanish military expedition

The moderate Spanish press had insisted on the need for intervention. The *Miguelistas* would not abide by the conditions imposed on the liberal revolutionaries. They were a threat to the throne. After the failure of the Wylde-Marquis of España mediation, the intervention could not be delayed. The Herald considered it necessary because there was a *casus foederis*. It was necessary to make the queen's party triumph against the party of the rebels, just as the other powers of the Quadruple Alliance contributed to making Isabel II's party triumph against the party of Don Carlos de Borbón⁽³⁾. The progressive press emphasized that *Cabralistas* and moderates were essentially the same party. The victory over the rebellious Portuguese liberals would have the consequence of further strengthening the Spanish Moderate Party. The intervention was considered an attack on Portugal's independence. Despite these criticisms, the diplomatic agreements were beginning to have an effect. Spanish land intervention was imminent. The expeditionary army would penetrate Portugal and, following the right bank of the Douro, would dislodge the revolutionaries from the points in its path and fall on Porto. Meanwhile, some forces would penetrate from Galicia, occupy Valença do Minho and control the entire area between the Douro and the Miño, preventing the insurgents from being able to help Porto. To execute this plan, the concentration of troops began. The headquarters of the observation army should be installed in Salamanca, whose forces would be located in that capital, Ciudad Rodrigo, Zamora and Toro.

On May 23, Méndez Vigo entered Tuy. He examined the positions of Valença's besiegers, exploring their surroundings. From Tuy he prepared to enter Portuguese territory to lift the siege by forces loyal to the Lisbon government. After Valença was occupied on June 3, a proclamation was addressed to the Portuguese. It was about ending the armed insurrection. Spain would participate to restore peace. Given the turn that events were taking, in a session held on June 5, the Junta accepted the bases of mediation as they had been proposed by the Marquis of España and Wylde. The Marquis of Loulé would march to Lisbon to submit to the queen. They asked Bernardo Roiz, Spanish consul in Porto, to do everything possible to stop the expeditionary troops that his government was sending to pacify the country. Since they had accepted the bases of mediation, the presence of foreign soldiers on Portuguese soil was not necessary. Bernardo Roiz rejected the request. He believed that the Spanish expeditionary forces should approach the city as quickly as possible. All the news that reached Lisbon coincided with the express willingness of the Junta to accept the conditions of mediation. Therefore, the moral effect of the intervention had been achieved. Once the submission of the Junta was achieved, it made no sense for the Spanish army to penetrate Portuguese territory. The Madrid cabinet had to consider the possibility of suspending or, at least, not rushing the march of the expeditionary force. Seymour and Varenne believed it was advisable

3. Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Francisco Contente Domingues, Joao Gouveia Monteiro. *Historia militar de Portugal*. (Lisboa: A esfera dos livros, 2017), 411.

to suspend the entry of Spanish troops. To achieve this, they had met with Bayard, who coldly welcomed the suggestion. He did not hide his conviction that the Spanish military occupation was a means to pacify the country. He was sure that, even if the Porto Junta submitted, a part of the Spanish expeditionary army would have to continue in Trás-os-Montes and Miño to disarm the guerrillas and maintain order, acting alongside Saldanha's forces, insufficient to take over the situation.

The march of the expeditionary forces would be suspended as soon as the Portuguese government requested it, and the amnesty was accepted. Bulwer, British ambassador in Madrid, asked Pacheco that Spanish troops not enter Portugal. But he could not accept the responsibility of suspending the march of the Spanish troops. Just to comply with the wishes announced by Seymour and Varenne, he sent instructions to Ayllón to agree with them on the possible suspension of the march of the Spanish troops. But only if the Lisbon government requests it. But the Junta had resolved not to submit to the authority of María II and not to surrender their weapons, rectifying what they had previously announced. This, despite knowing about the amnesty and the measures of grace granted by María II and having received the formal intimations made through the Spanish and British consuls in Porto and the commanders of the allied naval forces. His demand for the appointment of a new ministry had become the biggest obstacle to peace. The army had to penetrate as quickly as possible and continue its march towards Porto without suspending operations, unless Saldanha or Ayllón informed it. General Concha had to contact the Spanish minister in Lisbon as quickly as possible, from whom he would receive instructions.⁽⁴⁾

After giving a new organization to the expeditionary army, it was distributed into four divisions, one vanguard and three more, General Concha ordered the movement of Lavalette's forces with the 1st division of the expeditionary army and a brigade from the 3rd division, 300 horses and two mountain batteries. They would enter Braganza towards Mirandela. General Concha expressed to Mazarredo his fear that the Portuguese question would be resolved without the help of the Spanish army⁽⁵⁾. On June 11, the vanguard troops commanded by Lavalette entered Portugal. The next day the headquarters left Zamora, passing the Esla over the Ricobayo bridge. The first day of marching ended in Alcañices. That same day the vanguard troops entered Bragança. The Spanish troops stayed there because the rebels had cut a bridge and there were no supplies. For this last reason, the headquarters remained in Alcañices during the 13th, 14th, and 15th. There the operational army was organized into two sections; one would advance through Chaves and the other through Amarante. On June 16, the headquarters left for Braganza in the direction of Sejas, passing the Manzanas River through Quintanilla. Near Gimonde all forces gathered with headquarters. In the afternoon they were in Bragança. It was

4. A. H. de Oliveira Marques. *Breve Historia de Portugal*. (Lisboa: Presença 2006), 457-459.

5. Lorenzo Silva. *Sereno en el peligro. La aventura histórica de la Guardia Civil*. (Madrid: EDAF, 2010), 65.

announced that, if no unforeseen events arose, on the 22nd or 23rd they could meet against Porto. The Baron de Vinhaes oversaw protecting the communications and convoys of the Spanish army. While the bulk of the army rested in Braganza, Mata and Alós, in command of the vanguard composed of three battalions of hunters, two halves of Villaviciosa's cavalry and a battery, left for Amarante. The next day the headquarters and the first division under the command of Field Marshal Lavalette, which was made up of three brigades with six battalions, did so: the second division under the command of Brigadier Modesto de la Torre also with six battalions and the María Cristina cavalry regiment. The third division, under the command of Belestá, headed towards Chaves. The first two companies assigned to the sappers marched to the headquarters. Another was to join the third division. At dawn on the 19th, the headquarters left, carrying in the vanguard some companies of hunters and a party of sappers to prepare the ground. Destiny, Mirandela. Brigadier Belestá with eight battalions, a battery and two squadrons had to spend the night in Chaves the next day.

Lersundi had occupied the castle of Viana, previously abandoned by the revolutionaries. The soldiers loyal to the Junta were retreating towards Porto where there were about 11,000 armed men. On the 20th the expeditionary army arrived at Murza and on the 21st at Villa Real. The next day they marched towards Amarante. After the vanguard, the headquarters and the rest of the army entered this city. On the 23rd, after passing through Penafiel, he spent the night in Baltar and the nearby towns. Security measures were tightened. Lersundi arrived in Braga with the second brigade. It was received by its inhabitants with cheers and displays of joy. While the brigade advanced towards Porto, the third battalion of the American Infantry Regiment would remain in the city. They remained under the control of the Guimaraes and Penafiel expeditionary force. Lersundi, with the second brigade, entered Vila Nova de Famalicão on June 24 at the same time as the Belestá division, to which it was incorporated. In total 12 battalions with 16 mounted artillery pieces and three squadrons. The next day they advanced towards Porto.

Concha did it from Valongo with 10 battalions and forces from other arms. Ayllón still had no direct news from General Concha. He knew about the movements of the Spanish troops through the Portuguese Minister of War, Ponte da Barca, to whom Saldanha had telegraphed on the 24th. Concha had informed him from Villa Real, where he was on the 21st, that he would spend the night on the 24th in Valongo. On the morning of June 25, Saldanha's troops occupied the San Ovidio neighborhood, dependent on Porto⁶. That same day the headquarters and the operations army were definitively located in Vendas Novas. The vanguard and the first division had occupied it next to Medamela. The second and third divisions had positioned themselves on their right, occupying San Mames de Infesta, Pedrosos, and other points. Concha went to San Cosme to receive

6. Cristóbal Robles Jaén. "La intervención española en Portugal en 1847". (*Anales de Historia Contemporánea*, 15 (1999), 421.

Saldanha, and after holding the first tactical conference, he reviewed the vanguard brigade and the first division. When Concha left Valongo in the direction of Vendas Novas, Brigadier Vasconcelos, commissioned by the Junta, had presented himself to him, who wanted to reach a friendly settlement, after suspending hostilities. The next day he would present his proposals. The only condition was amnesty for all those who had participated in the uprising. Concha accepted it considering that it was contemplated in the four articles of mediation and for the convenience of occupying Porto as soon as possible. Vasconcelos confessed to Concha that the Junta did not want to negotiate with the commanders of the English and French fleet or with the consuls of these nations.

The Treaty of Gramido

Wylde, who came from Porto, arrived at the Saldanha headquarters on the 26th. Loulé had told him, on behalf of the Junta and coinciding with the information provided by Vasconcelos to Concha, that she was determined to abide by the royal authority. They would hand over the weapons under the conditions stipulated in the mediation. The only condition: that the city had to be occupied by Spanish troops. On June 27, Wylde, at the request of Loulé, met with General Concha, Marshal Saldanha, the French consul in Porto, Nujac, and with Senén Buena, the Spanish commissioner stationed at Saldanha's headquarters. When Concha told him to propose the most appropriate means to end the war, Loulé refused to speak in Saldanha's presence. Not wanting to be an obstacle to closing the conflict, he withdrew. Although Nujac also wanted to leave because he did not have authorization from his government to negotiate, Wylde asked him to stay, even if he did not vote or did so against it. Loulé presented a series of conditions that Junta considered essential to deliver the place. Among others, the most important were: Saldanha and his troops would not enter the square; The State would assume the debts incurred by the Junta; the Spanish army would not leave until the elections were held in Portugal; The jobs and pensions granted by the Junta to the royalists would be ratified and the prisoners taken to Das Antas, Sá da Bandeira and others would also be amnestied. Some were inadmissible and others were already rejected in the negotiations held by the Junta with the Marquis of Spain and Wylde himself during the mediation process. General Concha warned the commissioner of the Junta that the response would be quick and definitive. Until he arrived, he would order the artillery to disembark and prepare the assault on the city. An ultimatum was set for noon on June 28. If the besieged insisted on delaying the issue, work would begin to force their surrender.

In the early hours of June 28, Wylde received a letter from Lobo d'Avila and Pinto Basto, members of the Junta, where they revealed their willingness to continue negotiating. That night Junta sent Wylde a new letter. He had named Loulé and Vasconcelos as delegates in the negotiation. On the 29th, a new conference took place in Gramido, remarkably close to Porto. Concha and Buena attended as representatives of Spain; Wylde, from

the United Kingdom; the Marquis of Loulé y Vasconcelos, of the Junta⁽⁷⁾. Nujac also attended but would refuse to sign because he did not consider himself authorized to do so. Loulé delivered his new proposals. Some were modified, others were rejected, and the agreement was provisionally signed. Provisions were also adopted at the conference to occupy the forts of the city. Spanish troops would enter Porto on June 30. The city submitted to the obedience of the government of Maria II under the conditions established in the agreement. Porto, Vila Nova de Gaia, and the fortresses of the Douro would be occupied by Spanish troops, to whom their weapons would be handed over. In Porto, a Spanish garrison would remain, the English in the castle of Foz and the allied ships in the Douro. The safety and property of the Portuguese was guaranteed⁽⁸⁾. War honors were paid to the army of the Junta and passports were given to those who wanted to leave Portugal. The allies would strive for the government of Maria II to improve the officers of the old royalist army, and it was hoped that these would be compared with the promotions made in the Lisbon army. On June 29, the Junta ordered the release of the Duke of Terceira, his companions, political prisoners, and other prisoners of war. The excellent management of its commissioners in the negotiations was recognized and the forces that had fought at their side, the city of Porto, the citizens who supported it and the other authorities were publicly praised. He also addressed a proclamation to the Portuguese informing them of the signing of the agreement to end the war and return to royal obedience. The allies guaranteed compliance with the four articles of mediation. The Junta decreed on June 30 to ratify and enforce the convention signed in Gramido by civil and military authorities, as well as by their followers. Immediately afterwards it was decided to send a copy to the municipality of Porto and its civil governor. Silva Passos proposed the dissolution of the Junta upon concluding its mission, to which all its members agreed.

The forts located on the left bank of the Douro and the city of Porto were already in the power of the Spanish army, once the Junta was subject to the authority of the queen. Saldanha appointed a new civil governor. On the morning of the 30th there were no incidents when the Spanish troops took possession of the city's forts. At one in the afternoon, General Concha and his General Staff entered Porto amidst great displays of joy from the population. He addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Porto. The Spanish had cooperated to end the civil war without bloodshed. They were in Porto not as conquerors or victors, but as friends and peacemakers. Opinions, people, property, uses and customs would be respected. Normality had to preside over the daily life of the people of Porto. The collection of weapons began immediately, and more than 2,000 men were given passes to return to their homes. For those who belonged to the regular army,

7. Gonzalo de Porras y Rodríguez de León. "Un soldado español en la defensa de los derechos humanos. El Tratado de Gramido". *Dikaion: revista de actualidad jurídica*, 8(1999), 30-31.

8. Armando Carlos Alves. *Em busca de uma Sociologia da Policia*. (Lisboa: GNR, 2008). 29-58.

one month's leave. The English commodore hastened to communicate his intention to occupy the castle of Foz. Concha ordered the relief of the Spanish forces by the British.

In the south of Portugal and so that the fugitive forces of Setúbal, south of the Tagus, could not escape the persecution conducted against them by the Count of Vinhaes, Ayllón, at the request of the Portuguese government, requested Norzagaray, captain general of Extremadura, to collaborate with them. The Spanish government ordered Norzagaray to intern a body of troops close to 2,000 men in Portugal. The advance of the Spanish troops had also met no resistance. The population received them as peacemakers of a country exhausted by the war. On the 25th, Norzagaray entered Portugal at the head of two infantry battalions, a cavalry regiment, four pieces of wheeled artillery and four mountain artillery. As happened in Porto, the troops were well received in Elvas. Pacification was a reality in the territories controlled by the Spanish army. While Concha entered Oporto, Norzagaray did so in Portalegre. The north of the province of Alentejo was subject to the government of Lisbon, but not the Algarve. The remains of the *Juntero's* army that had refused to obey the government were concentrated in Faro. The Count of Vinhaes, from July 5 in Beja, headed to the Algarve, occupying Faro on July 10. Norzagaray arrived two days later in Estremoz, in the Alentejo, with the intention of leaving Portugal.

The Lisbon Protocols of July 1847

On the same day that the cessation of the blockade of the Douro bar was decreed, the diplomats of the allied powers, Ayllón, Seymour and Varenne, disapproved of the Gramido Convention. They did so on the Lisbon Protocol of July 2. Wylde and Concha had negotiated with the Junta as if it were the government of the country, without considering the formula for submission to the queen, which the officers had to subscribe to and confused the *Miguelistas* with the royalists. It was even more serious that Wylde allowed Concha's troops to remain indefinitely in Portugal. Ayllón was amazed at so much nonsense. Seymour did not want to disavow Wylde, but he associated himself with the Protocol, since it could be considered by María II as proof of the care taken by the three ministers to safeguard her dignity and interests. Bayard expressed his government's agreement with the Lisbon Protocol. Ayllón protested before Pacheco because Concha and Buenaga had deviated from his instructions by accepting the clauses contained in the Gramido Agreement. He made several objections. Wylde's name should not occupy the first place in the document, neither by rank nor by alphabetical order. It was not correct for the signatories of the agreement to assume the status of representatives of Spain and England. They had not justified what they relied on to consent to modifications to the conditions that formed the basis of the Protocol of May 21.

Regarding the articles, Ayllón made severe criticism. He attributed all responsibility for the convention to Wylde, since he could not understand that Concha would sign a

document so far removed from the policy followed by the Spanish government. Ayllón informed Concha of the signing of the Lisbon protocol of July 2 and sent her a copy. Concha justified his actions after his arrival in Valongo and in his first interview, César de Vasconcelos conveyed to him the Junta's refusal to negotiate with Saldanha and for his troops to enter the city. Concha consulted Saldanha, who begged her to continue the negotiation because he did not want to be an obstacle in the pacification of his country. At the first conference, on June 27, Loulé refused to speak to Saldanha, and Nujac declared that he was not authorized to commit to anything. Loulé presented unacceptable conditions. On the 29th the last conference took place in Gramido. Loulé arrived accompanied by Vasconcelos. Once the agreement document was drawn up, he had no qualms about signing it. He assumed Wylde agreed with the Allied representatives. I thought I complied with their wishes. Concha had some questions. Had he done more than ratify the wishes and intentions of the allies regarding the execution of the mediation? Could the voluntary absence of Marshal Saldanha be taken as a cause that invalidated the agreement? Who would have assumed responsibility for the consequences of armed clashes that could have occurred while France sent an authorized agent to negotiate? Should he have ordered the assault on Porto?

Its consequences would have been terrible and would have opened deep wounds in the always fragile Spanish-Portuguese relations. In the latter case, while many Spanish soldiers could die, France was limited to having one ship outside the bar. Maitland, head of the British naval forces in Porto, also did not wish to support an attack on Portugal's second city. Gramido's agreement could have defects of form and substance, but it was the only alternative to the horror of an assault against Porto. He believed the censorship entailed by the Lisbon Protocol of July 2 was undeserved. Ayllón should have been informed before proceeding to sign it. But he did not want to be an obstacle in the fulfillment of the Spanish government's commitments. That is why he had requested relief, if his conduct was not approved. Ayllón did not want to get into controversy with Concha. The agreement was made and had its effects on the pacification of Portugal. This was recognized by the allied ministers in Lisbon. When Concha traveled to this city to be congratulated by the kings, they would exchange impressions to dispel any hint of disagreement. Allied representatives were satisfied with the bloodless end of the war. But they had to safeguard their responsibility before their governments and that of Lisbon. Concha had powers for military capitulation but not for an agreement. The Lisbon Protocol was a guarantee and a duty for the allied representatives. Regarding his replacement, Ayllón offered his resignation if the presence of both was incompatible. When Pacheco received the Protocol, he regretted the discrepancy between Ayllón and Concha, but the Gramido Agreement was not objectionable. The Earl of Thomar himself had praised him. He pointed out some of Ayllón's observations.

Spain had achieved a privileged situation in Portugal that had to be maintained. Mazarredo received General Mata y Alós, sent by Concha. Once Isabel II was informed

and the Council of Ministers heard, the way in which the occupation of Porto had been conducted was approved. It was Ayllón who rushed to sign the Lisbon Protocol of July 2 without knowing the circumstances in which Concha had had to act. Any defect in form disappeared before the importance of what was achieved. By approving the agreement, the government was also ratifying a policy: "S. M. F. and his government are and will be obeyed throughout Portugal, the supporters of the Junta are amnestied, the representative institutions must return to full force. With the data provided and what had been told to him confidentially and officially by Pacheco, Ayllón would be convinced that Concha had acted correctly.

But Ayllón reiterated his desire to be relieved at the head of the Spanish legation in Lisbon when Pacheco informed him of the criticism of his management for the signing of the Protocol of July 2. Without getting into a controversy with Concha, I wanted to make my position clear to her. His observations referred to the act of the Gramido transaction. With his attitude he placed the allied ministers in Lisbon in serious trouble before their governments and that of María II. He had treated the Porto Junta as if it were a government acceding to demands, wholly or partially, contrary to the bases of the London Protocol. The intention of the Allied ministers was not to censure General Concha's conduct, but to avoid the consequences of a transaction in which they had not taken part. He had to have made a military capitulation with the heads of the Junta, but not an agreement including two absent powers and by which the castle of Foz was handed over to England. The censure by General Concha meant, in Ayllón's opinion, that he was not worthy of the trust placed in him. It destroyed his prestige and prevented him from fulfilling his mission. For all these reasons he wanted his relief.

General Concha confessed his distaste for the Lisbon Protocol. Not because it might seem like a criticism of his conduct, but because it reduced the merit of the troops who had accompanied him to Porto. But Ayllón should not resign. If he persisted in considering the incompatibility between the two, it would be Concha who would leave Portugal. Ayllón insisted to Pacheco on the considerations that had led him to sign the Lisbon Protocol of July 2. If he had not done so, he would have exposed himself to serious charges since there were important contradictions between the Gramido Convention and the London Protocol. He and Varenne thought that military capitulation would have been better because the same thing would have been achieved with the advantage of ruling out Wylde's unauthorized presence.

If the Spanish cabinet considered the Junta as a government, the Portuguese cabinet did not think the same. If the Protocol of July 2 had not been signed, Bayard would have complained about the stipulations of the Convention, as he confidentially communicated to Ayllón and reservedly to Thomar. Ayllón still did not understand how an agreement could be agreed upon that established binding conditions for four governments without having special powers to do so and without the representatives of the nations that were

obliged to comply with it signing the document. Pacheco had to return to this matter. He understood Ayllón's motives. That is why he had never used the word disapproval when rating his performance. The statement he had made to him that Porto was the seat of a government was true. But it was clear that it was not legitimate. I wanted to make it clear to the Spanish representative in Lisbon that I appreciated his comments. The progressive press, initially, accepted the situation created in Portugal.

The agreement between the Junta and the signatories of the London Protocol sought to achieve a time of reconciliation and forgetfulness, of strict legality and tolerance for all. But the moderate Spanish press harshly criticized the Gramido Convention. The revolution was the response to an arbitrary coup d'état protected by the court. The situation was resolved in an anomalous manner. Three constitutional monarchy nations intervene in an internal matter in Portugal and side with the enemies of the Constitution. But the Protocol of July 2 was not the only one that occurred because of the Gramido Convention. One of the problems that this posed was the occupation by English troops of the Foz castle, at the entrance to the Douro. In the London Protocol it was established that land intervention corresponded to Spain. Concha's troops would occupy it. All representatives agreed. This was established in the Lisbon Protocol of July 4. A few days later, the Allied representatives in Lisbon recognized the presence of the Spanish army as necessary, to which they gave the highest praise, as stated in the Protocol of July 9, to which the Portuguese government joined. For its part, the Spanish government rewarded the consul in Porto with the commendation of the Order of Isabella the Catholic. Manuel de la Concha, Count of Cancelada and Marquis of Revilla, First Class Grandee of Spain with the title of Marquis of Duero, was named. Luis López de la Torre Ayllón received the great cross of the order of Carlos III. For Méndez Vigo and Norzagaray, it would be admission as a grand cross of the order of San Fernando. The list of recipients from the Spanish and Portuguese sides expanded significantly⁽⁹⁾.

Anselmo Blaser arrived in Lisbon on July 6. He brought a congratulatory message from General Concha to María II for the end of the war. The kings showed their satisfaction and gratitude, which they wanted to personally convey to Concha. He and part of his General Staff arrived at the Lisbon Navy Arsenal on July 13, from Porto aboard the war steamer *Isabel II*. Concha was feted by the court of Lisbon and decorated with the Grand Cross of the Tower and the Sword. On the 17th, General Concha said goodbye to the kings and infantry and embarked for Porto. When he arrived, he informed Mazarredo of the agreement with Saldanha regarding the departure of part of the Spanish expeditionary army. The withdrawal would begin on July 22. 10 battalions, two squadrons and two mountain batteries would remain in Portugal. Of these, on July 28, four battalions, a squadron and a battery would leave, along with Concha. Brigadier Beleta assumed command of the remaining forces, who had to be in contact and under the orders of

9. José Félix González Román, Gerardo Pérez Hernández. *Caballeros de la Real y Militar Orden de San Fernando (Guardia Civil y Carabineros)*. (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2013), 24-26

Ayllón. Two months after the land intervention began, all Spanish troops would leave, as stipulated in the Treaty of London. If Marshal Saldanha wanted to extend the deadline, the Lisbon government would have to request it from the Allied powers.

But Bayard informed Ayllón that his government had no intention of doing so. The Spanish minister in Lisbon ordered Belestá that on August 11 all Spanish forces, both those in Porto and those in Valença, should leave the country. Those from Norzagaray had already begun their return to Spain from the Alentejo. If the Portuguese government requested their help, it would concentrate on Elvas. In any case, both Norzagaray and Belestá remained under Ayllón's orders. The *Portuense* press dedicated great praise to the Spanish army. In addition to a bloodless military intervention, there would be an amnesty and some administrative reforms and political changes would be made that would allow elections to be held. After this, which gave a surprising majority to the Cabralistas, Saldanha would form a government. Spain and France would separate from the United Kingdom at the end of the period of validity of the duties contracted between them to return their prerogatives to the Crown, guarantee their rights to those who had been wronged and punish with exclusion those who had violated the Letter and violated the law.

The Civil Guard

As we have seen, Spain, conditioned by its international commitments, had assembled an army corps of about 11,000 men in front of the Portuguese border, from Salamanca to Zamora. This force, under the orders of General D. Manuel de la Concha, and after some negotiations between the Government of Spain and those of France and Great Britain, entered the neighboring country in June 1847, to combat the revolution and ensure the crown of the young queen María II. The campaign, skillfully directed, ended in a brief time by the agreement called Porto, leaving our troops, upon withdrawing from that country, very pleasant memories for their good instruction, their moderation, and their discipline. Among them, providing their special service, a detachment of the Civil Guard formed by two sections of selected and veteran people⁽¹⁰⁾. Three officers with forty cavalries were appointed for this purpose, by virtue of a royal order of May 30, under the command of the second captain of the first third squadron, Mr. Francisco Aguirre⁽¹¹⁾.

On the correct choice of the guards who are to march into the Army, said the Duke of Ahumada in his warnings to the leaders of the regiments, it depends exclusively on whether the luster of the Corps is cemented in the armies, as it is achieving in the

10. Manuel Ballbé. *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)*. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983), 141-154.

11. Miguel Gistau Ferrando. *Historia de la Guardia Civil*. (Valdemoro (Madrid): Imprenta y encuadernación de la Guardia Civil, 1907), 472.

provinces⁽¹²⁾. And so it was, because that small force, by its severe bearing, correct discipline, and accuracy in service, earned the esteem and respect of its companions and the consideration of strangers, in occupied Portugal. The instructions for field service date from this time, which, circulated by royal order of the Ministry of War of June 7, were subsequently added to the *Cartilla* written expressly for the service of the Institute in the Expeditionary Army of Portugal, that was where they were applied for the first time⁽¹³⁾.

General De la Concha had, in his Headquarters, a Section of the Civil Guard of Cavalry composed of 43 numbers under the command of Captain Francisco Aguirre, which constitutes in modern terms the first international mission of the *Benemérita*⁽¹⁴⁾.

Portugal's armed intervention became a notable episode to demonstrate the professionalism of this nascent Institution. This small unit, which accompanied the expeditionary force, constituted a detachment of 43 cavalry guards. In the short time that this campaign lasted, the behavior of the guards was as worthy of praise as everywhere; and although the exemplary conduct and admirable discipline observed by the expeditionary troops, as well as the good reception of the inhabitants, did not present them with reasons to distinguish themselves, they were nevertheless seen during the march, and later in Porto, actively and vigilantly attending to good order, to the police and the protection of the Portuguese neighborhood⁽¹⁵⁾. The Portuguese expedition of 1847 was the first international mission conducted by the Civil Guard, serving the Institute's own forces, included in the General Staff of an operational army.

The mission entrusted to this young Civil Guard was a complete success. On September 2, 1847, Civil Guard officers José Casses y Sánchez, Francisco Blasco y Navarro, Vicente García y Aguado and José Pérez y Pérez were granted entry into the Order of Christ of Portugal⁽¹⁶⁾. Likewise, for the services provided in the expedition to Portugal, Francisco Aguirre, 2nd captain of the 1st cavalry, was granted the job of 2nd cavalry commander. Similarly, Luis Sabando, 2nd sergeant of the 11th cavalry third received the rank of 1st sergeant. In addition, several members of the Civil Guard received the Simple Cross of Isabel II for their bravery⁽¹⁷⁾. Belonging to the 1st third of the cavalry, the 1st corporal Domingo Fominaya, the 1st guard José María Pérez and the 1st guard Francisco Álvarez.

12. Miguel López Corral. *La Guardia Civil: claves históricas para entender a la Benemérita y a sus hombres (1844-1975)*. (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2009), 26-30.

13. Enrique Martínez Ruiz. *Policías y proscritos: estado, militarismo y seguridad en la España borbónica: (1700-1870)*. (San Sebastián de los Reyes, Madrid: Actas, 2014), 770-772

14. *Efemérides de la Guardia Civil*. (Madrid: Secretaría General Técnica del Ministerio del Interior, 2024), 63.

15. Crispín Ximénez de Sandoval. *Las instituciones de seguridad pública en España y sus dominios de Ultramar*. (Madrid: Imprenta y estereotipia de M. Rivadeneyra, 1858), 200.

16. *Escalañón general de Jefes y oficiales de la Guardia Civil en 1º de enero de 1875*. (Madrid: Imprenta del Boletín Oficial de la Guardia Civil, 1875), 121.

17. Luis Grávalos González, José Luis Calvo Pérez. *Condecoraciones militares españolas*. (Madrid: San Martín, 1988), 122.

Also receiving the same decoration were the 1st Guard Manuel Lorente belonging to the 8th Third Cavalry, the 2nd Guards of the 9th Third Cavalry Plácido Hidalgo and Valentín Suárez, as well as the 2nd Guard of the 11th Third Cavalry Pedro Bustos⁽¹⁸⁾.

Conclusions

Spanish-Portuguese relations in the 19th century must be understood within the framework of the approximation of the moderate Spanish regime to the conservative Portuguese one. With it, the nascent Moderate Party promoted a political option like its own. This was the first Spanish military intervention abroad during the reign of Isabel II. In this sense, this expedition to Portugal prefigures the policy of military interventions of the Liberal Union. In relation to the Spanish armed forces, the 1847 expedition has a notable double effect: It indirectly enhances the participation of the Army in active politics. From now on, Manuel Gutiérrez de la Concha will play a prominent role within the Conservative parties. A tradition that starts from the War of Independence is strengthened: the process of ennoblement of the army. Now Manuel Gutiérrez de la Concha receives the title of Marquis of Duero, apart from other distinctions distributed among those who participated in the negotiations and the campaign. Spain's will to conduct its own international policy is also evident, and it represents the first projection of the Elizabethan regime as an active entity in international politics. The intervention was another step in the western orientation of Spain's foreign policy. As for Portugal, the Spanish intervention did not change that country's special relations with the United Kingdom or the subordination status of Lisbon with respect to British guidelines on international politics.

The section of the Civil Guard assigned to that Spanish Operations Army was made up of Cavalry officers and civil guards. He reported directly to the chief of the General Staff of the Operations Army and dedicated himself to preventing the perpetration of common crimes and arresting the guilty, as well as maintaining order and complying with any orders received from the chief of the General Staff, regarding the march of luggage and muleteers. After the fall of Porto (*Portugal*) on June 30, the Civil Guard established a patrol service to guarantee the security of the city until the final withdrawal of Spanish troops in July of that same year.

18. *Guardia Civil. Escalafón general de antigüedad de los señores gefes y oficiales, perteneciente al año de 1848.* (Madrid: Imprenta de D. Victoriano Hernando, 1848), 45-46.

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